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When you buy a physical book from your local book shop or online retailer, you exchange a 
sum of money for legal title to the physical copy of that book (we’ll cover electronic books shortly). 
Of course, buying a book does not give you any ownership interest in the author’s copyright.  Thus, 
by spending $30 to acquire a physical book, you do not gain the right to make additional copies of 
that book, to adapt it for television, or to translate it into another language.  You simply own the 
physical copy that you bought.  By the same token, once you purchase the book from a retailer, 
neither the author nor the publisher has any further right to limit or charge you for the right to read 
the book, to lend it to your sister, or to sell it on eBay.  The publisher has authorized the retailer to 
sell the you book, and once they have granted that right, they have no ability to further control its 
destiny.  
This result, which should correspond with your intuitive understanding of how markets in 
copyrighted goods work, arises from what is known as the “first sale” doctrine.  A similar doctrine 
known as “exhaustion” applies with respect to goods marked with trademarks and to patented 
articles.  Despite their intuitive and straightforward origins, the modern application of the first sale 
and exhaustion doctrines to multi-component technologies distributed through multi-tier, 
international supply chains is fraught with complications that have made these doctrines among 
the most complex in the IP transactional landscape.  In this chapter, we will review the basic 
doctrines of first sale and exhaustion and then explore how they have evolved in the modern 
marketplace. 
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A. COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE 
Today, the copyright first sale doctrine is embodied in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.  It 
provides that “the owner of a particular copy … lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”.  That is, someone who owns a valid copy of a 
copyrighted work may further sell, transfer, donate or otherwise dispose of that copy without 
permission of the copyright owner, notwithstanding the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
distribute copies of the work under Section 106(3) of the Act. 
Prior to the enactment of the 1976 version of the Act, the extent of the first sale doctrine was 
not so clear.  The following case is one of the first to wrestle with the extent and scope of the first 
sale doctrine. 
 
BOBBS-MERRILL CO. V. STRAUS 
210 U.S. 339 (1908) 
 
DAY, JUSTICE 
The complainant in the circuit court, appellant here, the Bobbs-Merrill Company, brought suit 
against the respondents, appellees here, Isidor Straus and Nathan Straus, partners as R. H. Macy 
& Company, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to 
restrain the sale of a copyrighted novel, entitled "The Castaway," at retail at less than $1 for each 
copy. The circuit court dismissed the bill on final hearing. The decree of the circuit court was 
affirmed on appeal by the circuit court of appeals. 
The appellant is the owner of the copyright upon "The Castaway," obtained on the eighteenth 
day of May, 1904, in conformity to the copyright statutes of the United States. Printed immediately 
below the copyright notice, on the page in the book following the title page, is inserted the 
following notice: 
The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, 
and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright. 
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Macy & Company, before the commencement of the action, purchased copies of the book for 
the purpose of selling the same at retail. Ninety percent of such copies were purchased by them at 
wholesale at a price below the retail price by about forty percent, and ten percent of the books 
purchased by them were purchased at retail, and the full price paid therefor. 
It is stipulated in the record: 
Defendants at the time of their purchase of copies of the book, knew that it was a 
copyrighted book, and were familiar with the terms of the notice printed in each 
copy thereof, as above set forth, and knew that this notice was printed in every copy 
of the book purchased by them. 
The wholesale dealers from whom defendants purchased copies of the book 
obtained the same either directly from the complainant or from other wholesale 
dealers at a discount from the net retail price, and at the time of their purchase knew 
that the book was a copyrighted book, and were familiar with the terms of the notice 
printed in each copy thereof, as described above, and such knowledge was in all 
wholesale dealers through whom the books passed from the complainants to 
defendants. But the wholesale dealers were under no agreement or obligation to 
enforce the observance of the terms of the notice by retail dealers, or to restrict their 
sales to retail dealers who would agree to observe the terms stated in the notice. 
The defendants have sold copies of the book at retail at the uniform price of eighty-
nine cents a copy, and are still selling, exposing for sale, and offering copies of the 
book at retail at the price of eighty-nine cents per copy, without the consent of the 
complainant. 
The present case involves rights under the copyright act. The facts disclose a sale of a book at 
wholesale by the owners of the copyright at a satisfactory price, and this without agreement 
The Castaway: Three Great Men Ruined in One Year – A King, A Cad and a Castaway, by 
Hallie Ermine Rives (1904) [photo: Library of Congress] 
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between the parties to such sale obligating the purchaser to control future sales, and where the 
alleged right springs from the protection of the copyright law alone. It is contended that this power 
to control further sales is given by statute to the owner of such a copyright in conferring the sole 
right to "vend" a copyrighted book. 
A case such as the present one, concerning inventions protected by letters patent of the United 
States, has not been decided in this Court, so far as we are able to discover.  
We therefore approach the consideration of this question as a new one in this Court, and one 
that involves the extent of the protection which is given by the copyright statutes of the United 
States to the owner of a copyright under the facts disclosed in this record. Recent cases in this 
Court have affirmed the proposition that copyright property under the federal law is wholly 
statutory, and depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of 
the authority conferred under Article I, § 8, of the federal Constitution: 
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, 
to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries. 
The learned counsel for the appellant in this case, in the argument at bar, disclaims relief 
because of any contract, and relies solely upon the copyright statutes, and rights therein conferred. 
The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a view to effecting the purposes 
intended by Congress. They ought not to be unduly extended by judicial construction to include 
privileges not intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to 
their benefit of the rights Congress intended to grant. 
At common law, an author had a property in his manuscript, and might have redress against 
anyone who undertook to realize a profit from its publication without authority of the author. 
In Drone on Copyright, that author says, page 100: 
As the law is now expounded, there are important differences between the statutory 
and the common law light. The former exists only in works which have been 
published within the meaning of the statute, and the latter only in works which have 
not been so published. In the former case, ownership is limited to a term of years; 
in the latter, it is perpetual. The rights do not coexist in the same composition; when 
the statutory right begins, the common law right ends. Both may be defeated by 
publication. Thus, when a work is published in print, the owner's common law 
rights are lost, and, unless the publication be in accordance with the requirements 
of the statute, the statutory right is not secured. 
While the nature of the property and the protection intended to be given the inventor or author 
as the reward of genius or intellect in the production of his book or work of art is to be considered 
in construing the act of Congress, it is evident that to secure the author the right to multiply copies 
of his work may be said to have been the main purpose of the copyright statutes.  
This fact is emphasized when we note the title to the act of Congress, passed at its first session: 
"An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, 
to the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies, during the Times Therein Mentioned." 1 Stat. at 
Large, by Peters, c. 15, p. 124. 
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In order to secure this right, it was provided in that statute, as it has been in subsequent ones, 
that the authors of books, their executors, administrators, or assigns, shall have the "sole right and 
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" such book for a term of years, upon 
complying with the statutory conditions set forth in the act as essential to the acquiring of a valid 
copyright. Each and all of these statutory rights should be given such protection as the act of 
Congress requires, in order to secure the rights conferred upon authors and others entitled to the 
benefit of the act. Let us see more specifically what are the statutory rights, in this behalf, secured 
to one who has complied with the provisions of the law and become the owner of a copyright. 
They may be found in §§ 4952 … of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and are as follows: 
Any citizen of the United States or resident therein, who shall be the author, 
inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book, map, chart, dramatic or musical 
composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a 
painting, drawing, chromo, statute, statuary, and of models or designs intended to 
be perfected as works of the fine arts, and the executors, administrators, or assigns 
of any such person, shall, upon complying with the provisions of this chapter, have 
the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, 
finishing, and vending the same." 
It is the contention of the appellant that the circuit court erred in failing to give effect to the 
provision of § 4952, protecting the owners of the copyright in the sole right of vending the 
copyrighted book or other article, and the argument is that the statute vested the whole field of the 
right of exclusive sale in the copyright owner; that he can part with it to another to the extent that 
he sees fit, and may withhold to himself, by proper reservations, so much of the right as he pleases. 
What does the statute mean in granting "the sole right of vending the same?" Was it intended 
to create a right which would permit the holder of the copyright to fasten, by notice in a book or 
upon one of the articles mentioned within the statute, a restriction upon the subsequent alienation 
of the subject matter of copyright after the owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired 
full dominion over it and had given a satisfactory price for it? It is not denied that one who has 
sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The 
purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, 
although he could not publish a new edition of it. 
In this case, the stipulated facts show that the books sold by the appellant were sold at 
wholesale, and purchased by those who made no agreement as to the control of future sales of the 
book, and took upon themselves no obligation to enforce the notice printed in the book, 
undertaking to restrict retail sales to a price of one dollar per copy. 
The precise question therefore in this case is, does the sole right to vend (named in § 4952) 
secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict 
future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice 
in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been 
brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum? We do not think the statute 
can be given such a construction, and it is to be remembered that this is purely a question of 
statutory construction. There is no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license agreement 
controlling the subsequent sales of the book. 
In our view, the copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to 
multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed 
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in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom 
there is no privity of contract. This conclusion is reached in view of the language of the statute, 
read in the light of its main purpose to secure the right of multiplying copies of the work -- a right 
which is the special creation of the statute. True, the statute also secures, to make this right of 
multiplication effectual, the sole right to vend copies of the book, the production of the author's 
thought and conception. The owner of the copyright in this case did sell copies of the book in 
quantities and at a price satisfactory to it. It has exercised the right to vend. What the complainant 
contends for embraces not only the right to sell the copies, but to qualify the title of a future 
purchaser by the reservation of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer 
because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in 
the notice. To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales by a 
notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum would give a right not included in the terms of 
the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when 
interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment. 




Macy’s flagship department store on 34th and Broadway, photograph by Granger, “New York: 
Macys, 1908” [Library of Congress] 
 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Resale Price Maintenance.  In Bobbs-Merrill, the court analyzes, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, whether the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “vend” includes a right to dictate 
the prices at which future owners may resell a book.  The practice of setting minimum resale prices 
is referred to as “resale price maintenance”, and it warrants special scrutiny under the antitrust 
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laws (see Chapter 25.E).  Antitrust issues aside, why do you think that Bobbs-Merrill wished to 
set a minimum resale price for books that it had already sold to retailers?  How would Bobbs-
Merrill profit from Macy’s sale of the book at $1.00 rather than $0.89? 
2. Contract?  Bobbs-Merrill incorporated its price maintenance clause in the book itself.  
From a contract law standpoint, how binding to you think this restriction was on retailers like 
Macy’s? 
3. The Right to Vend.  The Court in Bobbs-Merrill held that a copyright owner’s statutory 
exclusive right to vend a book did not extend to the control of the terms of downstream sales of 
the book. Why not?  What language in the Copyright Act then in force persuaded the Court that 
this was the correct outcome? 
4. Limits of First Sale.  As set forth in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, the owner of a 
particular copy of a copyrighted work has the right to “sell or otherwise dispose of the possession 
of that copy”. In other words, the first sale exhausts the copyright owner’s exclusive right to 
transfer a copy of a work, which was granted under Section 106(3) of the Copyright Act. But the 
first sale doctrine does not exhaust the other exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder under 
Section 106, namely, the right to reproduce the work (§ 106(1)), the right to make derivative works 
(§ 106(2)) and the right to publicly perform the work (§§ 106(4)-(6)).  Why is the first sale doctrine 
limited to transfers of copies of copyrighted works? 
 
B. SOFTWARE SALE VERSUS LICENSE 
The Bobbs-Merrill case established the first sale principle in copyright law, a principle that 
was later codified in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.  But the first sale doctrine depends on 
there being an authorized sale of a copyrighted work.  What if a work is licensed rather than sold?  
Does the first sale doctrine apply?   
These questions are extremely important in the case of computer software. Even though 
software vendors convey copies of their software to users, either on tangible media (discs or 
memory devices) or electronically, the common practice in the software industry is to refer to 
software as licensed rather than sold.  So what rights does a consumer obtain when she downloads 
an app to her smartphone?  Does she “own” a copy of the software, which she can then resell or 
exploit as she would a book, or is she merely a licensee who does not own the copy in her 
possession.  Numerous cases considered this issue from the 1990s through the 2000s, most 
questioning the software vendor’s ability to impose restrictions on further transfer of the software 
on the user.  The following case, decided in the circuit that is home to the majority of the U.S. 
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VERNOR V. AUTODESK, INC. 
621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) 
 
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge. 
Timothy Vernor purchased several used copies of Autodesk, Inc.'s AutoCAD Release 14 
software (“Release 14”) from one of Autodesk's direct customers, and he resold the Release 14 
copies on eBay. Vernor brought this declaratory judgment action against Autodesk to establish 
that these resales did not infringe Autodesk's copyright. The district court issued the requested 
declaratory judgment, holding that Vernor's sales were lawful because of two of the Copyright 
Act's affirmative defenses that apply to owners of copies of copyrighted works, the first sale 
doctrine and the essential step defense. 
Autodesk distributes Release 14 pursuant to a limited license agreement in which it reserves 
title to the software copies and imposes significant use and transfer restrictions on its customers. 
We determine that Autodesk's direct customers are licensees of their copies of the software rather 
than owners, which has two ramifications. Because Vernor did not purchase the Release 14 copies 
from an owner, he may not invoke the first sale doctrine, and he also may not assert an essential 
step defense on behalf of his customers. For these reasons, we vacate the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to Vernor and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
A. Autodesk's Release 14 software and licensing practices 
The material facts are not in dispute. Autodesk makes computer-aided design software used by 
architects, engineers, and manufacturers. It has more than nine million customers. It first released 
its AutoCAD software in 1982. It holds registered copyrights in all versions of the software 
including the discontinued Release 14 version, which is at issue in this case. It provided Release 
14 to customers on CD- ROMs. 
Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to customers pursuant to an accompanying 
software license agreement (“SLA”), which customers must accept before installing the software. 
A customer who does not accept the SLA can return the software for a full refund. Autodesk offers 
SLAs with different terms for commercial, educational institution, and student users. The 
commercial license, which is the most expensive, imposes the fewest restrictions on users and 
allows them software upgrades at discounted prices. 
The SLA for Release 14 first recites that Autodesk retains title to all copies. Second, it states 
that  the customer has a nonexclusive and nontransferable license to use Release 14. Third, it 
imposes transfer restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting, leasing, or transferring the 
software without Autodesk's prior consent and from electronically or physically transferring the 
software out of the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions: 
YOU MAY NOT: (1) modify, translate, reverse engineer, decompile, or 
disassemble the Software ... (3) remove any proprietary notices, labels, or marks 
from the Software or Documentation; (4) use ... the Software outside of the Western 
Hemisphere; (5) utilize any computer software or hardware designed to defeat any 
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hardware copy-protection device, should the software you have licensed be 
equipped with such protection; or (6) use the Software for commercial or other 
revenue-generating purposes if the Software has been licensed or labeled for 
educational use only. 
Fifth, the SLA provides for license termination if the user copies the software without 
authorization or does not comply with the SLA's restrictions. Finally, the SLA provides that if the 
software is an upgrade of a previous version: 
[Y]ou must destroy the software previously licensed to you, including any copies 
resident on your hard disk drive ... within sixty (60) days of the purchase of the 
license to use the upgrade or update.... Autodesk reserves the right to require you 
to show satisfactory proof that previous copies of the software have been destroyed. 
Autodesk takes measures to enforce these license requirements. It assigns a serial number to 
each copy of AutoCAD and tracks registered licensees. It requires customers to input “activation 
codes” within one month after installation to continue using the software. The customer obtains 
the code by providing the product's serial number to Autodesk. Autodesk issues the activation code 
after confirming that the serial number is authentic, the copy is not registered to a different 
customer, and the product has not been upgraded. Once a customer has an activation code, he or 
she may use it to activate the software on additional computers without notifying Autodesk. 
 
B. Autodesk's provision of Release 14 software to CTA 
In March 1999, Autodesk reached a settlement agreement with its customer Cardwell/Thomas 
& Associates, Inc. (“CTA”), which Autodesk had accused of unauthorized use of its software. As 
part of the settlement, Autodesk licensed ten copies of Release 14 to CTA. CTA agreed to the 
SLA, which appeared (1) on each Release 14 package that Autodesk provided to CTA; (2) in the 
settlement agreement; and (3) on- screen, while the software is being installed. 
CTA later upgraded to the newer, fifteenth version of the AutoCAD program, AutoCAD 2000. 
It paid $495 per upgrade license, compared to $3,750 for each new license. The SLA for AutoCAD 
2000, like the SLA for Release 14, required destruction of copies of previous versions of the 
software, with proof to be furnished to Autodesk on request. However, rather than destroying its 
Release 14 copies, CTA sold them to Vernor at an office sale with the handwritten activation codes 
necessary to use the software. 
 
C. Vernor's eBay business and sales of Release 14 
Vernor has sold more than 10,000 items on eBay. In May 2005, he purchased an authentic used 
copy of Release 14 at a garage sale from an unspecified seller. He never agreed to the SLA's terms, 
opened a sealed software packet, or installed the Release 14 software. Though he was aware of the 
SLA's existence, he believed that he was not bound by its terms. He posted the software copy for 
sale on eBay. 
Autodesk filed a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) take-down notice with eBay 
claiming that Vernor's sale infringed its copyright, and eBay terminated Vernor's 
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auction.1Autodesk advised Vernor that it conveyed its software copies pursuant to non-transferable 
licenses, and resale of its software was copyright infringement. Vernor filed a DMCA counter-
notice with eBay contesting the validity of Autodesk's copyright claim. Autodesk did not respond 
to the counter-notice. eBay reinstated the auction, and Vernor sold the software to another eBay 
user. 
In April 2007, Vernor purchased four authentic used copies of Release 14 at CTA's office sale. 
The authorization codes were handwritten on the outside of the box. He listed the four copies on 
eBay sequentially, representing, “This software is not currently installed on any computer.” On 
each of the first three occasions, the same DMCA process ensued. Autodesk filed a DMCA take-
down notice with eBay, and eBay removed Vernor's auction. Vernor submitted a counter-notice 
to which Autodesk did not respond, and eBay reinstated the auction. 
When Vernor listed his fourth, final copy of Release 14, Autodesk again filed a DMCA take-
down notice with eBay. This time, eBay suspended Vernor's account because of Autodesk's 
repeated charges of infringement. Vernor also wrote to Autodesk, claiming that he was entitled to 
sell his Release 14 copies pursuant to the first sale doctrine, because he never installed the software 
or agreed to the SLA. In  response, Autodesk's counsel directed Vernor to stop selling the software. 
Vernor filed a final counter-notice with eBay. When Autodesk again did not respond to Vernor's 
counter-notice, eBay reinstated Vernor's account. At that point, Vernor's eBay account had been 
suspended for one month, during which he was unable to earn income on eBay. 
Vernor currently has two additional copies of Release 14 that he wishes to sell on eBay. 
Although the record is not clear, it appears that Vernor sold two of the software packages that he 
purchased from CTA, for roughly $600 each, but did not sell the final two to avoid risking further 
suspension of his eBay account. 
 
 
Autodesk’s AutoCAD 14 software 
 
 
1 Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), a copyright holder may notify an 
online service provider such as eBay that a user of the service has posted infringing material on the service. 
In order to benefit from the liability exclusions under the Act, the service provider must act promptly to 
take down the infringing content. [Ed.]  
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III. 
The Copyright Act confers several exclusive rights on copyright owners, including the 
exclusive rights to reproduce their works and to distribute their works by sale or rental. Id. § 106(1), 
(3). The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, an affirmative defense to 
copyright infringement that allows owners of copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies. 
The exclusive reproduction right is limited within the software context by the essential step 
defense, another affirmative defense to copyright infringement that is discussed further infra. Both 
of these affirmative defenses are unavailable to those who are only licensed to use their copies of 
copyrighted works. 
This case requires us to decide whether Autodesk sold Release 14 copies to its customers or 
licensed the copies to its customers. If CTA owned its copies of Release 14, then both its sales to 
Vernor and Vernor's subsequent sales were non-infringing under the first sale doctrine. However, 
if Autodesk only licensed CTA to use copies of Release 14, then CTA's and Vernor's sales of those 
copies are not protected by the first sale doctrine and would therefore infringe Autodesk's exclusive 
distribution right. 
We turn to our precedents governing whether a transferee of a copy of a copyrighted work is 
an owner or licensee of that copy. We then apply those precedents to CTA's and Vernor's 
possession of Release 14 copies. 
 
1. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.1977) 
In Wise, a criminal copyright infringement case, we considered whether copyright owners who 
transferred copies of their motion pictures pursuant to written distribution agreements had 
executed first sales. The defendant was found guilty of copyright infringement based on his for-
profit sales of motion picture prints. The copyright owners distributed their films to third parties 
pursuant to written agreements that restricted their use and transfer. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that the government failed to prove the absence of a first sale for each film. If the copyright 
owners' initial transfers of the films were first sales, then the defendant's resales were protected by 
the first sale doctrine and thus were not copyright infringement. 
To determine whether a first sale occurred, we considered multiple factors pertaining to each 
film distribution agreement. Specifically, we considered whether the agreement (a) was labeled a 
license, (b) provided that the copyright owner retained title to the prints, (c) required the return or 
destruction of the prints, (d) forbade duplication of prints, or (e) required the transferee to maintain 
possession of the prints for the agreement's duration. Our use of these several considerations, none 
dispositive, may be seen in our treatment of each film print. 
For example, we reversed the defendant's conviction with respect to Camelot. It was unclear 
whether the Camelot print sold by the defendant had been subject to a first sale. Copyright owner 
Warner Brothers distributed Camelot prints pursuant to multiple agreements, and the government 
did not prove the absence of a first sale with respect to each agreement. We noted that, in one 
agreement, Warner Brothers had retained title to the prints, required possessor National 
Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) to return the prints if the parties could select a mutual agreeable 
price, and if not, required NBC's certification that the prints were destroyed. We held that these 
factors created a license rather than a first sale.  
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We further noted, however, that Warner Brothers had also furnished another Camelot print to 
actress Vanessa Redgrave. The print was provided to Redgrave at cost, and her use of the print 
was subject to several restrictions. She had to retain possession of the print and was not allowed 
to sell, license, reproduce, or publicly exhibit the print. She had no obligation to return the print to 
Warner Brothers. We concluded, “While the provision for payment for the cost of the film, 
standing alone, does not establish a sale, when taken with the rest of the language of the agreement, 
it reveals a transaction strongly resembling a sale with restrictions on the use of the print .” There 
was no evidence of the print's whereabouts, and we held that “[i]n the absence of such proof,” the 
government failed to prove the absence of a first sale with respect to this Redgrave print. Since it 
was unclear which copy the defendant had obtained and resold, his conviction for sale of Camelot 
had to be reversed.  
Thus, under Wise, where a transferee receives a particular copy of a copyrighted work pursuant 
to a written agreement, we consider all of the provisions of the agreement to determine whether 
the transferee became an owner of the copy or received a license. We may consider (1) whether 
the agreement was labeled a license and (2) whether the copyright owner retained title to the copy, 
required its return or destruction, forbade its duplication, or required the transferee to maintain 
possession of the copy for the agreement's duration. We did not find any one factor dispositive in 
Wise: we did not hold that the copyright owner's retention of title itself established the absence of 
a first sale or that a transferee's right to indefinite possession itself established a first sale. 
 
 
2. The “MAI trio” of cases 
Over fifteen years after Wise, we again considered the distinction between owners and 
licensees of copies of copyrighted works in three software copyright cases, the “MAI trio”. See 
United States v. Wise involved a print of the 
1967 film Camelot starring Vanessa Redgrave 
and Richard Harris. 
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MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't, 
447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). In the MAI trio, we considered which software purchasers were 
owners of copies of copyrighted works for purposes of a second affirmative defense to 
infringement, the essential step defense. 
The enforcement of copyright owners’ exclusive right to reproduce their work under the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), has posed special challenges in the software context. In order 
to use a software program, a user's computer will automatically copy the software into the 
computer's random access memory (“RAM”), which is a form of computer data storage. Congress 
enacted the essential step defense to codify that a software user who is the “owner of a copy” of a 
copyrighted software program does not infringe by making a copy of the computer program, if the 
new copy is “created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction 
with a machine and ... is used in no other manner.” 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1). 
 The Copyright Act provides that an “owner of a copy” of copyrighted software may claim  the 
essential step defense, and the “owner of a particular copy” of copyrighted software may claim the 
first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117(a)(1). The MAI trio construed the phrase “owner of a 
copy” for essential step defense purposes. Neither Vernor nor Autodesk contends that the first sale 
doctrine’s inclusion of the word “particular” alters the phrase's meaning, and we “presume that 
words used more than once in the same statute have the same meaning throughout.” Accordingly, 
we consider the MAI trio's construction of “owner of a copy” controlling in our analysis of whether 
CTA and Vernor became “owner[s] of a particular copy” of Release 14 software. 
In MAI and Triad, the defendants maintained computers that ran the plaintiffs’ operating 
system software. When the defendants ran the computers, the computers automatically loaded 
plaintiffs' software into RAM. The plaintiffs in both cases sold their software pursuant to restrictive 
license agreements, and we held that their customers were licensees who were therefore not 
entitled to claim the essential step defense. We found that the defendants infringed plaintiffs' 
software copyrights by their unauthorized loading of copyrighted software into RAM. In Triad, 
the plaintiff had earlier sold software outright  to  some  customers. We noted that these customers 
were owners who were entitled to the essential step defense, and the defendant did not infringe by 
making RAM copies in servicing their computers.  
In Wall Data, plaintiff sold 3,663 software licenses to the defendant. The licenses (1) were 
non-exclusive; (2) permitted use of the software on a single computer; and (3) permitted transfer 
of the software once per month, if the software was removed from the original computer. The 
defendant installed the software onto 6,007 computers via hard drive imaging, which saved it from 
installing the software manually on each computer. It made an unverified claim that only 3,663 
users could simultaneously access the software. 
The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, contending that the defendant violated the 
license by “over-installing” the software. The defendant raised an essential step defense, 
contending that its hard drive imaging was a necessary step of installation. On appeal, we held that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction 
on the essential step defense. Citing MAI, we held that the essential step defense does not apply 
where the copyright owner grants the user a license and significantly restricts the user's ability to 
transfer the software. Since the plaintiff's license imposed “significant restrictions” on the 
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defendant's software rights, the defendant was a licensee and was not entitled to the essential step 
defense. 
In Wall Data, we acknowledged that MAI had been criticized in a Federal Circuit decision, but 
declined to revisit its holding, noting that the facts of Wall Data led to the conclusion that any error 
in the district court's failure to instruct was harmless. Even if the defendant owned its copies of the 
software, its installation of the software on a number of computers in excess of its license was not 
an essential step in the software's use.  
We read Wise and the MAI trio to prescribe three considerations that we may use to determine 
whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an owner of a copy. First, we consider whether 
the copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the 
copyright owner significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software. Finally, we 
consider whether the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions. Our holding reconciles the 
MAI trio and Wise, even though the MAI trio did not cite Wise.  
In response to MAI, Congress amended § 117 to permit a computer owner to copy software for 
maintenance or repair purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c). However, Congress did not disturb MAI's 
holding that licensees are not entitled to the essential step defense. 
  
IV. 
We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where the 
copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's 
ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions. Applying our holding to 
Autodesk's SLA, we conclude that CTA was a licensee rather than an owner of copies of Release 
14 and thus was not entitled to invoke the first sale doctrine or the essential step defense. 
Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed 
significant transfer restrictions: it stated that the license is 
nontransferable, the software could not be transferred or 
leased without Autodesk's written consent, and the 
software could not be transferred outside the Western 
Hemisphere. The SLA also imposed use restrictions 
against the use of the software outside the Western 
Hemisphere and against modifying, translating, or 
reverse-engineering the software, removing any 
proprietary marks from the software or documentation, or 
defeating any copy protection device. Furthermore, the 
SLA provided for termination of the license upon the licensee's unauthorized copying or failure to 
comply with other license restrictions. Thus, because Autodesk reserved title to Release 14 copies 
and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions, we conclude that its customers are licensees 
of their copies of Release 14 rather than owners. 
CTA was a licensee rather than an “owner of a particular copy” of Release 14, and it was not 
entitled to resell its Release 14 copies to Vernor under the first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
Therefore, Vernor did not receive title to the copies from CTA and accordingly could not pass 
ownership on to others. Both CTA's and Vernor's sales infringed Autodesk's exclusive right to 
distribute copies of its work. 
“a software user is a licensee 
rather than an owner of a copy 
[of a software program] where 
the copyright owner (1) specifies 
that the user is granted a license; 
(2) significantly restricts the 
user's ability to transfer the 
software; and (3) imposes 
notable use restrictions.” 
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Because Vernor was not an owner, his customers are also not owners of Release 14 copies. 
Therefore, when they install Release 14 on their computers, the copies of the software that they 
make during installation infringe Autodesk's exclusive reproduction right because they too are not 
entitled to the benefit of the essential step defense.  
 
V. 
Although our holding today is controlled by our precedent, we recognize the significant policy 
considerations raised by the parties and amici on both sides of this appeal. 
Autodesk, the Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”), and the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”) have presented policy arguments that favor our result. For 
instance, Autodesk argues in favor of judicial enforcement of software license agreements that 
restrict transfers of copies of the work. Autodesk contends that this (1) allows for tiered pricing 
for different software markets, such as reduced pricing for students or educational institutions; (2) 
increases software companies' sales; (3) lowers prices for all consumers by spreading costs among 
a large number of purchasers; and (4) reduces the incidence of piracy by allowing copyright owners 
to bring infringement actions against unauthorized resellers. SIIA argues that a license can exist 
even where a customer (1) receives his copy of the work after making a single payment and (2) 
can indefinitely possess a software copy, because it is the software code and associated rights that 
are valuable rather than the inexpensive discs on which the code may be stored. Also, the MPAA 
argues that a customer's ability to possess a copyrighted work indefinitely should not compel a 
finding of a first sale, because there is often no practically feasible way for a consumer to return a 
copy to the copyright owner. 
Vernor, eBay, and the American Library Association (“ALA”) have presented policy 
arguments against our decision. Vernor contends that our decision (1) does not vindicate the law's 
aversion to restraints on alienation of personal property; (2) may force everyone purchasing 
copyrighted property to trace the chain of title to ensure that a first sale occurred; and (3) ignores 
the economic realities of the relevant transactions, in which the copyright owner permanently 
released software copies into the stream of commerce without expectation of return in exchange 
for upfront payment of the full software price. eBay contends that a broad view of the first sale 
doctrine is necessary to facilitate the creation of secondary markets for copyrighted works, which 
contributes to the public good by (1) giving consumers additional opportunities to purchase and 
sell copyrighted works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain copies of 
works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing the proliferation of 
businesses. 
The ALA contends that the first sale doctrine facilitates the availability of copyrighted works 
after their commercial lifespan, by inter alia enabling the existence of libraries, used bookstores, 
and hand-to- hand exchanges of copyrighted materials. The ALA further contends that judicial 
enforcement of software license agreements, which are often contracts of adhesion, could 
eliminate the software resale market, require used computer sellers to delete legitimate software 
prior to sale, and increase prices for consumers by reducing price competition for software vendors. 
It contends that Autodesk's position (1) undermines 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), which permits non-
profit libraries to lend software for non-commercial purposes, and (2) would hamper efforts by 
non-profits to collect and preserve out-of-print software. The ALA fears that the software 
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industry's licensing practices could be adopted by other copyright owners, including book 
publishers, record labels, and movie studios. 
These are serious contentions on both sides, but they do not alter our conclusion that our 
precedent from Wise through the MAI trio requires the result we reach. Congress is free, of course, 
to modify the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense if it deems these or other policy 
considerations to require a different approach. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Policy Factors.  In Part V of its opinion, the court in Vernor discusses a number of public 
policy rationales both supporting and refuting the treatment of software as licensed rather than 
sold.  It acknowledges that while there are “serious contentions on both sides”, these do not alter 
the court’s conclusion, which it purports to base on its own binding precedent.  Which side of the 
debate do you feel has the stronger policy arguments in its favor? 
2. The Essential Step Defense. As noted by the court in Vernor, § 117(a)(1) of the Copyright 
Act provides that the “owner of a copy” of a copyrighted software program does not infringe by 
making a copy of the computer program if the new copy is “created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and ... is used in no other 
manner.”  In effect, this provision was intended to insulate the vast majority of software users 
whose computers “copy” every software program into their memory as part of the execution of 
that program.  But what happens to this essential step defense if software users do not “own” copies 
of the software programs?  Is anything still covered by the essential step defense?  How does the 
court deal with this issue?  Should Congress step in to amend § 117(a)(1) further?  If so, what 
amendment would you propose? 
3. Doubling Down on MAI.  In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that its 1993 decision 
in MAI was criticized by the Federal Circuit. In DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 
170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999), the Federal Circuit states:  
In the leading case on section 117 ownership, the Ninth Circuit considered an 
agreement in which MAI, the owner of a software copyright, transferred copies of 
the copyrighted software to Peak under an agreement that imposed severe 
restrictions on Peak’s rights with respect to those copies. The court held that Peak 
was not an “owner” of the copies of the software for purposes of section 117 and 
thus did not enjoy the right to copy conferred on owners by that statute. The Ninth 
Circuit stated that it reached the conclusion that Peak was not an owner because 
Peak had licensed the software from MAI. That explanation of the court’s decision 
has been criticized for failing to recognize the distinction between ownership of a 
copyright, which can be licensed, and ownership of copies of the copyrighted 
software. Plainly, a party who purchases copies of software from the copyright 
owner can hold a license under a copyright while still being an “owner” of a copy 
of the copyrighted software for purposes of section 117. We therefore do not adopt 
the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of all licensees as non-owners. 
Despite this criticism, the Federal Circuit later concedes that the Ninth Circuit was correct to 
consider Peak to be a licensee, and not an owner, of the software in question.  What’s more, the 
Federal Circuit found that the software use in its own case should be treated as a licensee and not 
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an owner.  Given these results, is it surprising that the Ninth Circuit effectively doubled-down on 
MAI in Vernor? 
4. MAI and Software Maintenance.  The Ninth Circuit’s MAI case is perhaps most infamous 
for its holding that a computer maintenance provider was liable for infringement when it ran a 
client’s software for maintenance purposes. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Vernor, “In response 
to MAI, Congress amended § 117 to permit a computer owner to copy software for maintenance 
or repair purposes.”  Section 117(c) of the Copyright Act reads as follows: 
(c) Machine Maintenance or Repair.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
106, it is not an infringement for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or 
authorize the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy is made solely 
by virtue of the activation of a machine that lawfully contains an authorized copy 
of the computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that 
machine, if— 
(1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed immediately after 
the maintenance or repair is completed; and 
(2) with respect to any computer program or part thereof that is not necessary for 
that machine to be activated, such program or part thereof is not accessed or used 
other than to make such new copy by virtue of the activation of the machine. 
Thus, the exception to infringement under Section 117(c) is based on a user’s ownership of a 
“machine”, rather than its ownership of a copy of a software program, as is the exclusion under § 
117(a)(1).  Did Congress get it right in § 117(c) but not § 117(a)(1)?  Should Congress seek to 
reconcile these statutory provisions? 
5.  Back to Books.  Suppose that the Bobbs-Merrill case had been heard the year after Vernor 
was decided.  Do you think that the court would have reached a different conclusion?  What if 
Bobbs-Merrill, instead of printing its $1.00 resale price limitation on the copyright page of each 
book, packaged the book in a cellophane wrapper through which the resale limitation was clearly 
visible. Would this change the outcome? What if Bobbs-Merrill distributed books under a 
“shrinkwrap” license agreement (see Chapter 17.A) that included the resale price limitation?  
Finally, what if Bobbs-Merrill had entered into a “Book Supply and Resale Agreement” with 
Macy’s, which contained a contractual clause imposing the resale price limitation?  At what point 
would the first sale doctrine yield to a contractual arrangement between the parties? 
6. First Sale in the Digital World?  Some might argue that the debate over whether the 
“purchase” of software on physical media is moot today, as almost all consumer software is 
distributed via online download, either to a computer or a phone.  In addition to software, most 
music, and a growing percentage of books, are also delivered electronically, with no physical copy 
conveyed.  As such, most of this electronic content is explicitly licensed to consumers, with no 
pretense of sale. What does this mean for the first sale doctrine under Bobbs-Merrill? Do 
consumers own any of their books, music or software today?  What are the implications of not 
owning one’s content? 
7. Software and Things.  Even if software programs themselves are licensed to consumers, 
software increasingly inhabits tangible products from kitchen appliances to automobiles. These 
products are still bought and sold.  What does it mean, then, to purchase a programmable toaster?  
Does the consumer own the aluminum body and circuitry, but not the software inside the device?  
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What does that mean when the consumer wishes to sell the toaster, or donate it to charity, or throw 
it away?  Licensees are not usually permitted to exercise these rights with respect to licensed 
software. Does the software producer thus begin to exert control over the consumer’s right to 
dispose of his or her tangible property?  If not, do we need to rethink the answer to the sale versus 
license question? 
8. A Step Back?  A year after Vernor, the Ninth Circuit decided UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 
628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).  The case related to promotional music CDs that UMG distributed 
to music critics and radio disc jockeys. The CDs were labeled with printed notices such as: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended 
recipient for  personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an 
agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of possession 
is not allowed and may be punishable under federal and state laws. 
Augusto acquired some of these CDs through unknown channels and sold them on eBay.  
UMG sued Augusto for copyright infringement, alleging that he violated UMG’s exclusive right 
to distribute the CDs. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Augusto, holding that, unlike copies of 
computer software, 
under all the circumstances of the CDs' distribution, the recipients were entitled to 
use or dispose of them in any manner they saw fit, and UMG did not enter a license 
agreement for the CDs with the recipients. Accordingly, UMG transferred title to 
the particular copies of its promotional CDs and cannot maintain an infringement 
action against Augusto for his subsequent sale of those copies. 
What do you make of this holding, especially in view of the express language on the CD labels 
that “This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended recipient”?  Is 
this case consistent with Vernor?  How does the holding of UMG gibe with shrinkwrap license 
cases such as ProCD v. Zeidenberg (see Chapter 17)? 
 
 
C. TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION AND FIRST SALE 
The gravamen of a trademark infringement claim is consumer confusion as to the source of a 
marked product.  For this reason, the law generally recognizes the right of the owner of a marked 
product, whether a handbag or a luxury car, to resell it without permission of the manufacturer.  
The source is still the same manufacturer, even if the particular product has been used. As 
explained by the Ninth Circuit in Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 
1077 (9th Cir. 1995): 
The right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not 
extend beyond the first sale of the product. Resale by the first purchaser of the 
original article under the producer’s trademark is neither trademark infringement 
nor unfair competition. 
Yet complications arise when a marked product is altered or repackaged in some way before 
being resold. The following case summarizes the law surrounding first sale and exhaustion of 
trademark rights. 
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AU-TOMOTIVE GOLD INC. V. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. 
603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) 
 
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
We are asked to decide whether the sale by Au-Tomotive Gold (“Auto Gold”) of marquee 
license plates bearing Volkswagen badges purchased from Volkswagen constitutes trademark 
infringement, or whether the sale of the plates is protected by the “first sale” doctrine. In Au-
Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. (“Auto Gold I”), 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 
2006), we concluded that Auto Gold’s production and sale of automobile accessories bearing 
Volkswagen’s trademarks created a sufficient likelihood of confusion to constitute trademark 
infringement. We remanded to the district court to address Auto Gold’s “first sale” and other 
defenses. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction to 
Volkswagen. 
We affirm. We hold that the “first sale” doctrine does not provide a defense because Auto 
Gold’s marquee license plates create a likelihood of confusion as to their origin. 
 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Auto Gold produces and sells automobile accessories for specific makes of cars. Volkswagen 
and its subsidiary Audi are car manufacturers with well-known trademarks. The trademark at issue 
in this appeal is the familiar Volkswagen logo consisting of the letters “VW” inside a circle. 
Beginning in the 1990s, Auto Gold produced and sold products bearing Volkswagen and Audi 
trademarks without permission from Volkswagen or Audi. It sold four products: license plates, 
license plate frames, key chains, and marquee license plates. The first three products used replicas 
of the companies’ trademarks. However, the marquee license plates used actual VW badges 
purchased on the open market from a Volkswagen dealer. Auto Gold asserts its “first sale” defense 
only as to the marquee plates. 
The marquee license plates are plain silver or black plates on which Auto Gold has mounted 
the VW badges. These badges are sold by Volkswagen and are ordinarily used as replacements for 
the badges found on the hoods or trunks of Volkswagen vehicles. Auto Gold purchased the badges, 
altered them by removing prongs and (in some cases) gold-plating them, and mounted them on the 
marquee plates. The plates were packaged with labels that explained that the plates were not 
produced or sponsored by Volkswagen. 
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Auto Gold sold marquee license plates bearing Volkswagen decals 
 
Both parties accept for purposes of this appeal that Volkswagen had knowledge of Auto Gold’s 
products as early as January 1999. In September 1999, a Volkswagen representative sent a letter 
to Auto Gold requesting that it cease using the trademarks. When Auto Gold refused to do so, a 
Volkswagen representative sent a second letter in October 1999. A Volkswagen representative 
sent a third letter in February 2001. 
On April 19, 2001, Auto Gold filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its activities did 
not constitute an infringement or dilution of Volkswagen or Audi trademarks. Volkswagen and 
Audi counterclaimed, alleging federal trademark counterfeiting and infringement under § 32 of the 
Lanham Act, false designation, trademark dilution, and related state-law claims. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment. 
The district court granted summary judgment to Auto Gold on all claims, holding that under 
the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” the trademarks were “functional” and therefore not 
protected by trademark law. We reversed. We held that “the use of Volkswagen and Audi’s marks 
is neither aesthetic nor independent of source identification.” Rather, we held, consumers buy Auto 
Gold products because of the products’ identification with the companies’ brands. We then 
remanded to the district court for consideration of Auto Gold’s “first sale” and other related 
defenses.  
The district court rejected Auto Gold’s “first sale” [defense] and granted Volkswagen summary 
judgment and a permanent injunction. Auto Gold timely appealed. 
 
III. Discussion 
Auto Gold argues that because it purchased actual VW badges from a Volkswagen dealer for 
use on the marquee license plates, the “first sale” doctrine protects the sale of the plates. We hold 
that the “first sale” doctrine does not provide a defense because the plates create a likelihood of 
confusion as to their origin. We do not base our holding on a likelihood of confusion among 
purchasers of the plates. Rather, we base it on the likelihood of post-purchase confusion among 
observers who see the plates on purchasers’ cars. 
 
1. Background 
The “first sale” doctrine was first introduced in an opinion by Justice Holmes in Prestonettes, 
Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). Prestonettes purchased toilet powder and perfumes produced 
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and trademarked by Coty. Prestonettes incorporated the Coty products into its own products by 
combining the powder with a binder to create a cream and by rebottling the perfumes into smaller 
bottles. The Supreme Court held that Prestonettes did not violate trademark law. “The defendant 
of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what it bought, to divide 
either the original or the modified product, and to sell it so divided.”  
The Court further held that Prestonettes could identify the components of its products as being 
Coty trademarked products so long as its labels were not misleading. For example, Prestonettes 
could place a label on the perfume bottles stating, “Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty, 
states that the contents are Coty’s ... independently rebottled in New York.” It rejected Coty’s 
argument that Prestonettes should not be allowed to use the Coty trademark in its description of 
the product because Prestonettes’s products might be inferior. It wrote, “If the compound was 
worse than the constituent, it might be a misfortune to [Coty], but [Coty] would have no cause of 
action, as [Prestonettes] was exercising the rights of ownership and only telling the truth. The 
existence of a trademark would have no bearing on the question.” The Court relied on the fact that 
consumers would not be confused about the manufacturer of the product. “A trade-mark only gives 
the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of 
another’s product as his.” 
Application of the “first sale” doctrine has generally focused on the likelihood of confusion 
among consumers. In Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th 
Cir.1995), we held that the “first sale” doctrine protected Longs when it purchased Sebastian hair 
products from a distributor and sold them in its own store despite Sebastian’s efforts to allow only 
“Sebastian Collective Members” to sell the products. We recognized the principle that “the right 
of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend beyond the first 
sale of the product.” We emphasized that this rule “preserves an area of competition by limiting 
the producer’s power to control the resale of its product,” while ensuring that “the consumer gets 
exactly what the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the particular producer.”  
We also applied the “first sale” doctrine in Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 
1084-85 (9th Cir.1998), in which Costco purchased porcelain figurines manufactured by Enesco, 
repackaged them in allegedly inferior packaging, and sold them in its own stores. We held that 
Costco could repackage and sell the Enesco figurines, but that it was required to place labels on 
the packages that disclosed to the public that Costco had repackaged Enesco’s original product. 
We rejected Enesco’s argument that it would be harmed, even with this disclosure, because of the 
poor quality of the packaging. “The critical issue is whether the public is likely to be confused as 
a result of the lack of quality control.”  
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In Enesco v. Price/Costco, Costco repackaged porcelain angels manufactured by Enesco in allegedly 
inferior packaging 
 
A separate line of cases further illustrates the central role of the likelihood of confusion, 
including post-purchase confusion, in trademark infringement claims. In this line of cases, we have 
held that producers committed trademark infringement by selling refurbished or altered goods 
under their original trademark. None of these cases directly addressed the “first sale” doctrine, but 
they establish that activities creating a likelihood of post-purchase confusion, even among non-
purchasers, are not protected. 
In Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v. Surgical Tech., Inc. (“Surgi-Tech’’), 285 F.3d 848, 
852-53 (9th Cir.2002), SurgiTech repaired Storz endoscopes at the request of hospitals that owned 
them. Surgi-Tech sometimes rebuilt the endoscopes, replacing every part and retaining only the 
block element bearing Storz’s trademarks. At an earlier time, Surgi-Tech had etched its own mark 
into rebuilt endoscopes to make clear what it had done, but Surgi-Tech had stopped that practice. 
Storz submitted evidence of confusion on the part of surgeons who were not the purchasers of the 
endoscopes but who used them and mistakenly blamed Storz when they malfunctioned. We held 
that there was a triable issue of fact on Storz’s trademark infringement claim, even though there 
was no claim of purchaser confusion. We relied entirely on the possibility of confusion among 
non-purchasers, noting that such confusion “may be no less injurious to the trademark owner’s 
reputation than confusion on the part of the purchaser at the time of sale.”  
We also relied on the likelihood of non-purchaser confusion in Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704 (9th Cir.1999). The defendant sold used Rolex watches that had been 
“reconditioned” or “customized” with non-Rolex parts. We agreed with the district court that 
“retention of the original Rolex marks on altered ‘Rolex’ watches ... was deceptive and misleading 
as to the origin of the non-Rolex parts, and likely to cause confusion to subsequent or downstream 
purchasers, as well as to persons observing the product.”  
In both Surgi-Tech and Rolex, we made clear that the defendants did not deceive the direct 
purchasers of the products. Rather, in both cases, we found trademark infringement based on a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of non-purchasers. 
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2. Application to the Marquee Plates 
We held in Auto Gold I that the marquee license plates create a likelihood of post-purchase 
confusion on the part of observers of the plates. “Shorn of their disclaimer-covered packaging, 
Auto Gold’s products display no indication visible to the general public that the items are not 
associated with Audi or Volkswagen. The disclaimers do nothing to dispel post-purchase 
confusion.” It is likely that a person on the street who sees an Auto Gold marquee license plate 
with a VW badge will associate the plate with Volkswagen. Indeed, customers buy marquee 
license plates principally to demonstrate to the general public an association with Volkswagen. 
“The demand for Auto Gold’s products is inextricably tied to the trademarks themselves.”  
Auto Gold, however, maintains that the likelihood of post-purchase confusion does not matter. 
Auto Gold argues, first, that confusion among non-purchasers is irrelevant in “first sale” cases. 
However, Auto Gold cannot point to any case in which a court has held that the “first sale” doctrine 
applies when there is a likelihood of post-purchase confusion. In Prestonettes, there was no 
suggestion that a third-party could be confused about, or even be aware of, the origin of the facial 
cream or perfume used by a purchaser. Likewise, there was no possibility of post-purchase 
confusion as to the origin of the hair products in Sebastian or the porcelain figurines in Enesco. 
In each case in which a court has applied the “first sale” doctrine, the court either had good 
reason not to be concerned with post-purchase confusion or took steps to avoid addressing the 
issue. In Alexander Binzel Corp., the court noted that Binzel sold its parts to be incorporated into 
welding guns produced by other manufacturers. The defendant’s “use of Binzel nozzles is fully 
consistent with Binzel’s profit motive as well as the manner Binzel has chosen to control its 
product’s reputation.” In Dad’s Kid Corp., the court noted that baseball trading cards are regularly 
repackaged, displayed, or mounted, and that there was therefore “no likelihood that anyone will 
be confused as to origin by reason of Dad’s Kid’s treatment of genuine cards.” In Scarves by Vera, 
Inc., the court noted that the plaintiff’s trademark could be seen on some of the defendant’s bags. 
It therefore insisted that a disclaimer label be sewn into the bag near the clasp, and plainly visible 
to anyone opening the handbag. 
Post-purchase confusion creates a free-rider problem. Auto Gold contends that in “first sale” 
cases “the element of ‘free-riding’ present in other post-purchase confusion cases disappears 
because the producer has paid the price asked by the trademark owner for the ‘ride.’ ” This 
contention misses the point. When a producer purchases a trademarked product, that producer is 
not purchasing the trademark. Rather, the producer is purchasing a product that has been 
trademarked. If a producer profits from a trademark because of post-purchase confusion about the 
product’s origin, the producer is, to that degree, a free-rider. 
For example, a producer may purchase non-functioning Rolex watches and refurbish them with 
non-Rolex parts, leaving only the original easing. Even if the producer adequately explains the 
nature of the refurbished watches to purchasers, the producer nonetheless infringes on Rolex’s 
trademarks by profiting from the Rolex name. In such a case, the purchasers buy the watches in 
order to make others think that they have bought a true Rolex watch. The same holds true for new 
but relatively cheap products that prominently display a well-known trademark. If the producer 
purchases such a trademarked product and uses that product to create post-purchase confusion as 
to the source of a new product, the producer is free-riding even though it has paid for the 
trademarked product. 
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Next, Auto Gold argues that there is no trademark infringement because its marquee plates are 
of high quality. But likelihood of confusion, not quality control, is “the ‘key-stone’ of trademark 
law.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Circuit Breakers & Elec. Supply Inc., 106 F.3d 894, 900 
(9th Cir.1997). Courts have consistently held for plaintiffs where there is a possibility of confusion, 
even where defendants are not selling lower quality goods. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue 
Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821-22 (9th Cir.1980) (pocket tabs on Wrangler jeans infringed upon 
Levi’s trademark by creating a likelihood of post-purchase confusion despite no contention that 
Wrangler jeans were of lower quality). Similarly, courts have consistently held for defendants 
where there was no possibility of confusion, despite the fact that the defendants may have lowered 
the quality of goods. See, e.g., Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 367; Enesco Corp., 146 F.3d at 1087. 
Finally, Auto Gold argues that the public interest is served by the competition that results from 
the availability of its products. It may be true that Auto Gold’s activities serve to reduce the price 
paid by consumers for marquee plates. But trademark law protects trademark holders from the 
competition that results from trademark infringement, irrespective of its effect on prices.  
We therefore conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Volkswagen on its trademark infringement claim. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Point of Confusion.  Much of the court’s reasoning in Auto Gold hangs on the distinction 
between confusion at the point of sale versus post-purchase confusion.  What is the significance 
of this distinction in the exhaustion analysis?  Do you agree with the court’s determination that 
post-purchase confusion should be the deciding factor in such cases?   
2. Who is Confused?  Closely related to the point at which confusion is measured is the 
question of whose confusion is relevant.  If confusion is at the point of sale, then the customer 
making the purchase is the one likely to be confused, and the one that the law seeks to protect.  But 
who is the victim of post-purchase confusion?  If the purpose of trademark law is to prevent 
consumer confusion as to the source of goods, why should the law protect individuals who are not 
making the decision to purchase the particular good in question?  Who is really being protected 
here? 
3. The Public Interest.  As noted by the court, “Auto Gold argues that the public interest is 
served by the competition that results from the availability of its products.” Do you agree with 
Auto Gold? Why did the court summarily dismiss this argument?  Are there public interest factors 
that should be considered in trademark exhaustion cases? 
4. Used, Refurbished and Like New.  As noted in the introduction to this Part, the owner of a 
trademarked product is free to resell it without the authorization of the trademark owner on the 
theory that the product was genuinely produced by the trademark owner. This right is limited, 
however, if the reseller claims that the product is “new” or if the reseller has altered, reconditioned 
or repackaged the product. In Surgi-Tech and Rolex, discussed by the court in Auto Gold, 
substantial reconditioning of branded products altered them sufficiently that resale under their 
original brand was deemed to be likely to cause consumer confusion.  But in cases such as 
Prestonettes and Enesco, repackaging of a branded product was permitted so long as the reseller 
adequately informed the consumer.  Given that Auto Gold did not make any changes to the VW 
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sticker that it used on its marquee license plates how would you square the holding in Auto Gold 
with these precedents? 
 
 
D. PATENT EXHAUSTION 
Just as with copyrighted materials and goods bearing trademarks, patented articles are subject 
to an exhaustion doctrine.  The Supreme Court offers the rationale for this doctrine in United States 
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942): 
the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when 
the patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the 
article, and that, once that purpose is realized, the patent law affords no basis for 
restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold. 
Yet the patent exhaustion doctrine originated long before the Court’s decision in Univis.  The 
following case is often identified as the origin of the patent exhaustion doctrine in the U.S. 
 
ADAMS V. BURKE 
84 U.S. 453 (1873) 
On the 26th day of May, 1863, letters-patent were granted to Merrill & Horner, for a certain 
improvement in coffin lids, giving to them the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to 
others to be used, the said improvement. 
On the 13th day of March, 1865, Merrill & Horner, the patentees, by an assignment duly 
executed and recorded, assigned Lockhart & Seelye, of Cambridge, in Middlesex County, 
Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said patentees had in the invention 
described in the said letters-patent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is ten miles, having the city 
of Boston as a centre. They subsequently assigned the patent, or what right they retained in it, to 
one Adams. 
Adams now filed a bill in the court below, against a certain Burke, an undertaker, who used in 
the town of Natick (a town about seventeen miles from Boston, and therefore outside of the circle 
above mentioned) coffins with lids of the kind patented, alleging him to be an infringer of their 
patent, and praying for an injunction, discovery, profits, and other relief suitable against an 
infringer. 
The defendant pleaded in bar: 
“That he carries on the business of an undertaker, having his place of business in Natick, in 
said district; that, in the exercise of his said business, he is employed to bury the dead; that when 
so employed it is his custom to procure hearses, coffins, and whatever else may be necessary or 
proper for burials, and to superintend the preparation of graves, and that his bills for his services 
in each case, and the coffin, hearse, and other articles procured by him, are paid by the personal 
representatives of the deceased; that, since the date of the alleged assignment to the plaintiff of an 
interest in the invention secured by the said letters-patent, he has sold no coffins, unless the use of 
coffins by him in his said business, as above described, shall be deemed a sale; has used no coffins, 
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except in his said business as aforesaid; and has manufactured no coffins containing the said 
invention; and that since the said he has used in his business as aforesaid, in Natick, no coffin 
containing the invention secured by said letters-patent, except such coffins containing said 
invention as have been manufactured by said Lockhart & Seelye, within a circle, whose radius is 
ten miles, having the city of Boston as its centre, and sold within said circle by said Lockhart & 
Seelye, without condition or restriction." 
 
The dispute in Adams v. Burke: Merrill & Horner grant Lockhart & Seelye an exclusive license 
to a patented coffin lid within a 10-mile radius of Boston and assign the remaining rights to 
Adams.  Lockhart & Seelye sell coffins to Burke, a Natick undertaker.  Adams sues Burke for 
infringement. 
 
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. 
The question presented by the plea in this case is a very interesting one in patent law, and the 
precise point in it has never been decided by this court, though cases involving some of the 
consideration which apply to it have been decided, and others of analogous character are frequently 
recurring. The vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as the public interest, 
admonish us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no more than what is directly in issue. 
We have repeatedly held that where a person had purchased a patented machine of the patentee 
or his assignee, this purchase carried with it the right to the use of that machine so long as it was 
capable of use, and that the expiration and renewal of the patent, whether in favor of the original 
patentee or of his assignee, did not affect this right. The true ground on which these decisions rest 
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is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with 
it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time. 
The right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are each substantive rights, and 
may be granted or conferred separately by the patentee. But, in the essential nature of things, when 
the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole value is in 
its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right to restrict that use. The 
article, in the language of the court, passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the 
patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he 
claims for the use of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of 
the purchaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees. 
If this principle be sound as to a machine or instrument whose use may be continued for a 
number of years, and may extend beyond the existence of the patent, as limited at the time of the 
sale, and into the period of a renewal or extension, it must be much more applicable to an 
instrument or product of patented manufacture which perishes in the first use of it, or which, by 
that first use, becomes incapable of further use, and of no further value. Such is the case with the 
coffin-lids of appellant's patent. 
It seems to us that, although the right of Lockhart & Seelye to manufacture, to sell, and to use 
these coffin-lids was limited to the circle of ten miles around Boston, that a purchaser from them 
of a single coffin acquired the right to use that coffin for the purpose for which all coffins are used. 
That so far as the use of it was concerned, the patentee had received his consideration, and it was 
no longer within the monopoly of the patent. It would be to engraft a limitation upon the right of 
use not contemplated by the statute nor within the reason of the contract to say that it could only 
be used within the ten-miles circle. Whatever, therefore, may be the rule when patentees subdivide 
territorially their patents, as to the exclusive right to make or to sell within a limited territory, we 
hold that in the class of machines or implements we have described, when they are once lawfully 
made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be implied for benefit of the patentee or his 
assignees or licensees. 
A careful examination of the plea satisfies us that the defendant, who, as an undertaker, 
purchased each of these coffins and used it in burying the body which he was employed to bury, 
acquired the right to this use of it freed from any claim of the patentee, though purchased within 
the ten-mile circle and used without it. 
The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the plaintiff's bill is, therefore, 
AFFIRMED. 
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Figures from U.S. Patent No. 38,713 (May 26, 1863) “Improvement in Coffin Lids” 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. The Power of Exhaustion. Lockhart & Seelye had the right to manufacture and sell patented 
coffin lids within a 10-mile radius of Boston.  Burke, who purchased a coffin from them, used it 
in Natick, beyond the 10-mile radius.  Yet the Court denied the claim of Adams, who was the 
owner of the patent rights beyond the 10-mile radius.  Why?  Because when Lockhart & Seelye 
made an authorized sale to Burke, the patent rights in that coffin were exhausted and Adams could 
no longer assert them against those particular coffins.  This is a potent concept.  What if Lockhart 
& Seelye set up a coffin factory and began to ship their coffins around the world?  Should Adams 
feel aggrieved?  At what point might Adams have a claim against a user of a Lockhart & Seelye 
coffin beyond the 10-mile radius? 
2. A Limitation on Use? What if the original patentee had assigned to Lockhart & Seelye only 
the right to manufacture coffins for use within a 10-mile radius of Boston?  Could Adams then 
have argued that the right to use the patented coffins outside of the 10-mile radius was never 
granted to Lockhart & Seelye, and thus could not be exhausted by their sale to Burke?  For more 
on this issue, see Part D, below.  
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QUANTA COMPUTER, INC. V. LG ELECTRONICS 
553 U.S. 617 (2008) 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS 
For over 150 years this Court has applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to limit the patent 
rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item. In this case, we decide whether 
patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of a patented system that must be combined 
with additional components in order to practice the patented methods. The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine does not apply to method patents at all and, in the 
alternative, that it does not apply here because the sales were not authorized by the license 
agreement. We disagree on both scores. Because the exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, 
and because the license authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody the patents in 
suit, the sale exhausted the patents. 
 
I 
Respondent LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE), purchased a portfolio of computer technology patents 
in 1999, including the three patents at issue here: U.S. Patent Nos. 4,939,641 (’641); 5,379,379 
(’379); and 5,077,733 (’733) (collectively LGE Patents). The main functions of a computer system 
are carried out on a microprocessor, or central processing unit, which interprets program 
instructions, processes data, and controls other devices in the system. A set of wires, or bus, 
connects the microprocessor to a chipset, which transfers data between the microprocessor and 
other devices, including the keyboard, mouse, monitor, hard drive, memory, and disk drives. 
The data processed by the computer are stored principally in random access memory, also 
called main memory. Frequently accessed data are generally stored in cache memory, which 
permits faster access than main memory and is often located on the microprocessor itself. Id., at 
84. When copies of data are stored in both the cache and main memory, problems may arise when 
one copy is changed but the other still contains the original “stale” version of the data. The ‘641 
patent addresses this problem. It discloses a system for ensuring that the most current data are 
retrieved from main memory by monitoring data requests and updating main memory from the 
cache when stale data are requested. The ’379 patent relates to the coordination of requests to read 
from, and write to, main memory. The ’733 patent addresses the problem of managing the data 
traffic on a bus connecting two computer components, so that no one device monopolizes the bus.  
LGE licensed a patent portfolio, including the LGE Patents, to Intel Corporation (Intel). The 
cross-licensing agreement (License Agreement) permits Intel to manufacture and sell 
microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE Patents (the Intel Products). The License 
Agreement authorizes Intel to “make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or 
otherwise dispose of” its own products practicing the LGE Patents. Notwithstanding this broad 
language, the License Agreement contains some limitations. 
Relevant here, it stipulates that no license 
is granted by either party hereto ... to any third party for the combination by a third 
party of Licensed Products of either party with items, components, or the like 
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acquired ... from sources other than a party hereto, or for the use, import, offer for 
sale or sale of such combination. 
The License Agreement purports not to alter the usual rules of patent exhaustion, however, 
providing that, “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties 
agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would 
otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.” 
In a separate agreement (Master Agreement), Intel agreed to give written notice to its own 
customers informing them that, while it had obtained a broad license “ensur[ing] that any Intel 
product that you purchase is licensed by LGE and thus does not infringe any patent held by LGE,” 
the license “does not extend, expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by 
combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.” 
 The Master Agreement also provides that “a breach of this Agreement shall have no effect on 
and shall not be grounds for termination of the Patent License.” 
Petitioners, including Quanta Computer (collectively Quanta), are a group of computer 
manufacturers. Quanta purchased microprocessors and chipsets from Intel and received the notice 
required by the Master Agreement. Nonetheless, Quanta manufactured computers using Intel parts 
in combination with non-Intel memory and buses in ways that practice the LGE Patents. Quanta 
does not modify the Intel components and follows Intel’s specifications to incorporate the parts 
into its own systems. 
LGE filed a complaint against Quanta, asserting that the combination of the Intel Products with 
non-Intel memory and buses infringed the LGE Patents. The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Quanta, holding that, for purposes of the patent exhaustion doctrine, the license LGE 
granted to Intel resulted in forfeiture of any potential infringement actions against legitimate 
purchasers of the Intel Products. In a subsequent order limiting its summary judgment ruling, the 
court held that patent exhaustion applies only to apparatus or composition-of-matter claims that 
describe a physical object, and does not apply to process, or method, claims that describe 
operations to make or use a product.  
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed 
that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims. In the alternative, it 
concluded that exhaustion did not apply because LGE did not license Intel to sell the Intel Products 
to Quanta for use in combination with non-Intel products. 
We granted certiorari. 
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The parties in Quanta v. LGE: LGE, which held three patents covering aspects of a chip’s design, 
Intel, which manufactured chips under license from LG, and Quanta, which purchased Intel chips for use 
in its computers 
 
II 
The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. 
[The early history of patent exhaustion is omitted] 
This Court most recently discussed patent exhaustion in United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 
U.S. 241 (1942), on which the District Court relied. Univis Lens Company, the holder of patents 
on eyeglass lenses, licensed a purchaser to manufacture lens blanks2 by fusing together different 
lens segments to create bi- and tri-focal lenses and to sell them to other Univis licensees at agreed-
upon rates. Wholesalers were licensed to grind the blanks into the patented finished lenses, which 
they would then sell to Univis-licensed prescription retailers for resale at a fixed rate. Finishing 
retailers, after grinding the blanks into patented lenses, would sell the finished lenses to consumers 
at the same fixed rate. The United States sued Univis under the Sherman Act, alleging unlawful 
restraints on trade.3 Univis asserted its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the antitrust suit. 
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether Univis’ patent monopoly survived the sale of 
the lens blanks by the licensed manufacturer and therefore shielded Univis’ pricing scheme from 
the Sherman Act. 
The Court assumed that the Univis patents containing claims for finished lenses were practiced 
in part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who ground the blanks into lenses, and held that 
the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents on the finished lenses. The Court explained that 
the lens blanks “embodi[ed] essential features of the patented device and [were] without utility 
until ... ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.” The Court noted that: 
 
2 Lens blanks are “rough opaque pieces of glass of suitable size, design and composition for use, when 
ground and polished, as multifocal lenses in eyeglasses.” 
3 For a discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, see Chapter 25 [Ed.] 
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where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies essential 
features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and has  
destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he 
has sold his invention so far as it  is or may be embodied in that particular article. 
In sum, the Court concluded that the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of 
an item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does not completely 
practice the patent—such that its only and intended use is to be finished under the terms of the 
patent. 




LGE argues that the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable here because it does not apply to 
method claims, which are contained in each of the LGE Patents. LGE reasons that, because method 
patents are linked not to a tangible article but to a process, they can never be exhausted through a 
sale. Rather, practicing the patent—which occurs upon each use of an article embodying a method 
patent—is permissible only to the extent rights are transferred in an assignment contract. Quanta, 
in turn, argues that there is no reason to preclude exhaustion of method claims, and points out that 
both this Court and the Federal Circuit have applied exhaustion to method claims. It argues that 
any other rule would allow patent holders to avoid exhaustion entirely by inserting method claims 
in their patent specifications. 
Quanta has the better of this argument. Nothing in this Court’s approach to patent exhaustion 
supports LGE’s argument that method patents cannot be exhausted. It is true that a patented method 
may not be sold in the same way as an article or device, but methods nonetheless may be 
“embodied” in a product, the sale of which exhausts patent rights. Our precedents do not 
differentiate transactions involving embodiments of patented methods or processes from those 
involving patented apparatuses or materials. To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that 
method patents were exhausted by the sale of an item that embodied the method. These cases rest 
on solid footing. Eliminating exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the 
exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent 
claims to describe a method rather than an apparatus. Apparatus and method claims “may approach 
each other so nearly that it will be difficult to distinguish the process from the function of the 
apparatus.” By characterizing their claims as method instead of apparatus claims, or including a 
method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its task, a patent drafter could 
shield practically any patented item from exhaustion. 
 This case illustrates the danger of allowing such an end-run around exhaustion. On LGE’s 
theory, although Intel is authorized to sell a completed computer system that practices the LGE 
Patents, any downstream purchasers of the system could nonetheless be liable for patent 
infringement. Such a result would violate the longstanding principle that, when a patented item is 
“once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of 
the patentee.” We therefore reject LGE’s argument that method claims, as a category, are never 
exhaustible. 
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B 
We next consider the extent to which a product must embody a patent in order to trigger 
exhaustion. Quanta argues that, although sales of an incomplete article do not necessarily exhaust 
the patent in that article, the sale of the microprocessors and chipsets exhausted LGE’s patents in 
the same way the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents in Univis. Just as the lens blanks in 
Univis did not fully practice the patents at issue because they had not been ground into finished 
lenses, Quanta observes, the Intel Products cannot practice the LGE Patents—or indeed, function 
at all—until they are combined with memory and buses in a computer system. … We agree with 
Quanta that Univis governs this case. As the Court there explained, exhaustion was triggered by 
the sale of the lens blanks because their only reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent 
and because they “embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.” Each of those 
attributes is shared by the microprocessors and chipsets Intel sold to Quanta under the License 
Agreement. 
First, Univis held that “the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in 
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.” 
Here, LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than incorporating them 
into computer systems that practice the LGE Patents. Nor can we discern one: A microprocessor 
or chipset cannot function until it is connected to buses and memory. And here, as in Univis, the 
only apparent object of Intel’s sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the Intel 
Products into computers that would practice the patents. 
Second, the lens blanks in Univis “embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.” 
Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products constitute a material part of the patented invention 
and all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis, the incomplete article substantially 
embodies the patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is the application of 
common processes or the addition of standard parts. Everything inventive about each patent is 
embodied in the Intel Products.  
 
 
An Intel chip integrated into a computer board 
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C 
Having concluded that the Intel Products embodied the patents, we next consider whether their 
sale to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights. Exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by 
the patent holder.  
LGE argues that there was no authorized sale here because the License Agreement does not 
permit Intel to sell its products for use in combination with non-Intel products to practice the LGE 
Patents. It cites General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 and 305 U.S. 
124 (1938), in which the manufacturer sold patented amplifiers for commercial use, thereby 
breaching a license that limited the buyer to selling the amplifiers for private and home use. The 
Court held that exhaustion did not apply because the manufacturer had no authority to sell the 
amplifiers for commercial use, and the manufacturer “could not convey to petitioner what both 
knew it was not authorized to sell.” LGE argues that the same principle applies here: Intel could 
not convey to Quanta what both knew it was not authorized to sell, i.e., the right to practice the 
patents with non-Intel parts. 
LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel–LGE transaction. Nothing in the 
License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who 
intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It broadly permits Intel to “make, use, [or] sell” 
products free of LGE’s patent claims. To be sure, LGE did require Intel to give notice to its 
customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not licensed those customers to practice its patents. 
But neither party contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect. In any event, the 
provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master Agreement, and LGE does not 
suggest that a breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. 
Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on 
the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice. 
LGE points out that the License Agreement specifically disclaimed any license to third parties 
to practice the patents by combining licensed products with other components. But the question 
whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its right to 
practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on 
Intel’s own license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents. 
Alternatively, LGE invokes the principle that patent exhaustion does not apply to post-sale 
restrictions on “making” an article. But this is simply a rephrasing of its argument that combining 
the Intel Products with other components adds more than standard finishing to complete a patented 
article. As explained above, making a product that substantially embodies a patent is, for 
exhaustion purposes, no different from making the patented article itself. In other words, no further 
“making” results from the addition of standard parts—here, the buses and memory—to a product 
that already substantially embodies the patent. 
The License Agreement authorized Intel to sell products that practiced the LGE Patents. No 
conditions limited Intel’s authority to sell products substantially embodying the patents. Because 
Intel was authorized to sell its products to Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE 
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The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent 
holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of 
the article. Here, LGE licensed Intel to practice any of its patents and to sell products practicing 
those patents. Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially embodied the LGE Patents 
because they had no reasonable noninfringing use and included all the inventive aspects of the 
patented methods. Nothing in the License Agreement limited Intel’s ability to sell its products 
practicing the LGE Patents. Intel’s authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the 
scope of the patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer assert its patent rights against 
Quanta. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
 
 
 NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Exhaustion of Method Claims.  According to some observers, the Court thought that the 
principal holding of Quanta established that patent exhaustion applied to method claims. As 
Justice Thomas writes, failing to recognize patent exhaustion of method claims would be “an end-
run around exhaustion”.  What did he mean? 
2. Embodiment of a Patent.  The Court in Quanta relies heavily on its earlier reasoning in 
Univis, in which patents covering finished optical lenses were found to be exhausted upon the 
patentee’s sale of unfinished lens blanks. How can an unpolished piece of glass embody the 
“essential features” of an optical lens?  By the same token, how can Intel’s chips, which lacked 
the busses and memory claimed in LGE’s patents, exhaust those patents? 
3. A License Exclusion?  The License Agreement between LGE and Intel stated that “no 
license is granted … to any third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products 
… with items, components, or the like acquired ... from sources other than a party hereto, or for 
the use, import, offer for sale or sale of such combination.”  What was the purpose of this clause? 
Why do you think it was written in terms of no license rights being granted to a third party?  Why 
do you think that Intel, knowing that it planned to sell chips to computer manufacturers like 
Quanta, agreed to this exclusionary language?5 
 
4 [n. 7]  We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE's other 
contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion 
on whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent 
damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may 
protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question 
before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise 
as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws”). 
5 For a discussion of the parties’ possible business motives in this transaction, see Amelia Smith Rinehart, 
Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 Harv. J. L. Tech. 483, 521 (2010). 
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What do you make of the additional clause in the License Agreement, “nothing herein shall in 
any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply when a party 
hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.” Why would the parties include such a clause in the 
License Agreement?  Which of them do you think insisted on this clause? 
Of course, the Court, in analyzing the License Agreement, concluded that the exclusionary 
language was largely irrelevant.  Quanta was not arguing that it had obtained a license from LGE, 
it was arguing that LGE’s patent rights were exhausted upon Intel’s sale of chips.  Why was this 
such an important difference? 
If LGE really wanted to limit the rights that Intel’s customers obtained, couldn’t LGE have 
limited the rights that it granted to Intel in the first place?  That is, could LGE’s license to Intel 
have been limited to manufacturing and selling chips on a stand-alone basis, but not combining 
the chips with other computer components? Would such a limitation have defeated patent 
exhaustion? What might have Intel’s reaction been to such language? 
4. Customer Notification and Limitations.  Under a separate Master Agreement between LGE 
and Intel, Intel agreed to notify its customers that Intel’s broad license from LGE “does not extend, 
expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by combining an Intel product with any 
non-Intel product.” What was the purpose of this notification requirement?  Why would Intel agree 
to this requirement? Did such a notice have any legal effect on Intel’s customers? 
5. Other Contractual Limitations?  Footnote 7 of the Quanta opinion has occasioned 
significant speculation.  The Court seemingly leaves open the door to a breach of contract claim 
even if patent rights have been exhausted.  Thus, if Intel had failed to notify Quanta of LGE’s 
position that computer manufacturers were not licensed under LGE’s patents, LGE might have a 
breach of contract claim against Intel.  What damages might be available to LGE if such a claim 
were successful, given the exhaustion of LGE’s patents? 
6. What is an Exhaustive License?  What constitutes a “license” for purposes of patent 
exhaustion?  The license that LGE granted to Intel clearly exhausted LGE’s patents.  But what if 
the agreement were less clear?  For example, in De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 
273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927), the Supreme Court held that "No formal granting of a license is 
necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used by the owner of the patent, or any conduct 
on his part exhibited to another from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents 
to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a 
license”.  And in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit wrote that "A license may amount to no more than a covenant by 
the patentee not to sue the licensee for making, using or selling the patented invention.”  Given 
this precedent, could a patent holder’s conduct short of granting a formal license agreement 
exhaust its patents? 
Consider, for example, the “CDMA ASIC Agreements” that patent owner Qualcomm entered 
into with makers of wireless telecommunication chips, as described in FTC v. Qualcomm (9th Cir., 
Aug. 11, 2020). As described by the court, these agreements “allow Qualcomm’s competitors to 
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practice Qualcomm’s [patents] royalty-free”, though they are not called licenses.  Could such 
agreements exhaust Qualcomm’s patents?6 
7. Exhaustion and Self-Propagating Inventions – Patented Plants.  In Bowman v. Monsanto, 
569 U.S. 278 (2013), Monsanto patented a genetic modification that makes soybean plants 
resistant to glyphosate, a potent herbicide marketed by Monsanto as Roundup.7  Monsanto and its 
licensees sell these seeds to growers who are contractually permitted to use or sell the resulting 
soybeans for consumption (human or animal). However, they must also agree not to save any of 
the harvested soybeans for replanting.  One farmer, Vernon Bowman, however, thought he found 
a way to circumvent Monsanto’s replanting restrictions. As the Court explains, he 
went to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans” intended for human or 
animal consumption; and planted them in his fields. Those soybeans came from 
prior harvests of other local farmers. And because most of those farmers also used 
Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate that many of the purchased 
soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented technology. When he applied a 
glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields, he confirmed that this was so; a significant 
proportion of the new plants survived the treatment, and produced in their turn a 
new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait. Bowman saved seed from that 
crop to use in his late-season planting the next year—and then the next, and the 
next, until he had harvested eight crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted 
saved seed from the year before (sometimes adding more soybeans bought from the 
grain elevator), sprayed his fields with glyphosate to kill weeds (and any non-
resistant plants), and produced a new crop of glyphosate- resistant—i.e., Roundup 
Ready—soybeans. 
After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued Bowman for infringing its patents 
on Roundup Ready seed. Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a defense, arguing 
that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans because they were the 
subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain elevator). 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled against Bowman, reasoning as follows: 
Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans 
he purchased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself 
or feed them to his animals ... But the exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman 
to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission (either 
express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did. He took the soybeans 
he purchased home; planted them in his fields at the time he thought best; applied 
glyphosate to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking the Roundup Ready 
trait); and finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. That is 
how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the original product 
 
6 For a more in-depth consideration of this question, see Jorge L. Contreras, “No License, No Problem” – 
Is Qualcomm’s Ninth Circuit Antitrust Victory a Patent Exhaustion Defeat?, Patently-O blog, Aug. 31, 
2020. 
7 The plaintiffs in several class actions also allege that glyphosate is a carcinogen that has caused them 
significant personal injury and death. 
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is a seed. Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented invention, the 
exhaustion doctrine does not protect him. 
What do you think of the Court’s reasoning with respect to patent exhaustion? Should all of 
Monsanto’s patent rights have been exhausted with respect to each seed once it was sold the first 
time? Does it make a difference that a seed, by its very nature, will grow into a soybean plant 
without substantial alteration by its owner? 
The Court, in supporting its result, also relies on several policy and instrumentalist arguments, 
attempting to demonstrate that any other result would be irrational. 
Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit. After 
inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, “receiv[e] [its] 
reward” for the first seeds it sells. But in short order, other seed companies could 
reproduce the product and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto of its 
monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from 
Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply 
his initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum—each time 
profiting from the patented seed without compensating its inventor. Bowman’s late-
season plantings offer a prime illustration.  
What alternative policy arguments would you raise if you represented Bowman? 
  
Monsanto successfully sued farmer Vernon Bowman for planting genetically-modified seeds that he 
obtained from a grain elevator [photo: Aaron P. Bernstein, NY Times, Feb. 15, 2013] 
 
8. Exhaustion Across IP Types.  Now that you have seen how the first sale and exhaustion 
doctrines work across copyright, trademark and patent law, what common features can you identify 
among these three bodies of law?  What important differences do you find? 
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E. CONDITIONAL SALES AND POST-SALE RESTRICTIONS 
Ever since Adams v. Burke, patent licensors have experimented with contractual mechanisms 
to limit the rights that their licensees can impart to purchasers of licensed products.  They sought 
to limit contractually the rights granted to licensees in such a way that the licensees’ sale of 
products would not, under the right circumstances, exhaust the patent. For example, what if the 
patent holders in Adams v. Burke had expressly limited Lockhart & Seelye’s rights to the sale of 
coffins for use within a 10-mile radius of Boston?  Would Burke’s use outside of that radius have 
constituted patent infringement?   
The question of the effect of “conditional sales” of patented articles was addressed by the 
Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  In that case, 
Mallinckrodt produced a patented device known as “UltraVent” which delivered a radioactive 
aerosol mist to the lungs of a patient for the diagnosis and treatment of pulmonary disease.  Each 
UltraVent device was marked “Single Use Only.” The package insert provided with each unit 
stated that the entire contaminated device should be disposed of as biohazardous waste material. 
Contrary to these instructions, several hospitals that purchased UltraVent devices did not dispose 
of them after the first use, but instead shipped them to Medipart, which sterilized and returned 
them to the hospitals as “reconditioned” devices. The hospitals then used these reconditioned 
devices in apparent violation of their “Single Use Only” labeling.  Mallinckrodt, upon learning of 
this practice, sued Medipart for patent infringement and inducement to infringe.  It argued, among 
other things, that: 
• the restriction on reuse could be construed as a label license for a specified 
field of use, wherein the field is single (i.e., disposable) use, 
• the restriction is valid and enforceable under the patent law because the use 
is within the scope of the patent grant, and the restriction does not enlarge 
the patent grant, 
• a license to less than all uses of a patented article is well recognized and a 
valid practice under patent law,  
• the restriction is reasonable because it is based on health, safety, efficacy, 
and liability considerations and violates no public policy, 
• use in violation of the restriction is patent infringement, 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Mallinckrodt, reasoning that: 
If the sale of the UltraVent was validly conditioned under the applicable law such 
as the law governing sales and licenses, and if the restriction on reuse was within 
the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified, then violation of the restriction 
may be remedied by action for patent infringement. 
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IMPRESSION PRODUCTS, INC. V. LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
581 U.S. ___ (2017) 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
I 
The underlying dispute in this case is about laser printers—or, more specifically, the cartridges 
that contain the powdery substance, known as toner, that laser printers use to make an image appear 
on paper. Respondent Lexmark International, Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells toner cartridges 
to consumers in the United States and around the globe. It owns a number of patents that cover 
components of those cartridges and the manner in which they are used. When toner cartridges run 
out of toner they can be refilled and used again. This creates an opportunity for other companies—
known as remanufacturers—to acquire empty Lexmark cartridges from purchasers in the United 
States and abroad, refill them with toner, and then resell them at a lower price than the new ones 
Lexmark puts on the shelves. Not blind to this business problem, Lexmark structures its sales in a 
way that encourages customers to return spent cartridges. It gives purchasers two options: One is 
to buy a toner cartridge at full price, with no strings attached. The other is to buy a cartridge at 
roughly 20 percent off through Lexmark’s “Return Program.” A customer who buys through the 
Return Program still owns the cartridge but, in exchange for the lower price, signs a contract 
agreeing to use it only once and to refrain from transferring the empty cartridge to anyone but 
Lexmark. To enforce this single-use/no-resale restriction, Lexmark installs a microchip on each 
Return Program cartridge that prevents reuse once the toner in the cartridge runs out. 
Lexmark’s strategy just spurred remanufacturers to get more creative. Many kept acquiring 
empty Return Program cartridges and developed methods to counteract the effect of the 
microchips. With that technological obstacle out of the way, there was little to prevent the re-
manufacturers from using the Return Program cartridges in their resale business. After all, 
Lexmark’s contractual single-use/no-resale agreements were with the initial customers, not with 
downstream purchasers like the remanufacturers. 
 
 
A technician refills a printer ink cartridge 
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Lexmark, however, was not so ready to concede that its plan had been foiled. In 2010, it sued 
a number of remanufacturers, including petitioner Impression Products, Inc., for patent 
infringement with respect to two groups of cartridges. One group consists of Return Program 
cartridges that Lexmark sold within the United States. Lexmark argued that, because it expressly 
prohibited reuse and resale of these cartridges, the remanufacturers infringed the Lexmark patents 
when they refurbished and resold them. The other group consists of all toner cartridges that 
Lexmark sold abroad and that remanufacturers imported into the country. Lexmark claimed that it 
never gave anyone authority to import these cartridges, so the remanufacturers ran afoul of its 
patent rights by doing just that. 
Eventually, the lawsuit was whittled down to one defendant, Impression Products, and one 
defense: that Lexmark’s sales, both in the United States and abroad, exhausted its patent rights in 
the cartridges, so Impression Products was free to refurbish and resell them, and to import them if 
acquired abroad. Impression Products filed separate motions to dismiss with respect to both groups 
of cartridges. The District Court granted the motion as to the domestic Return Program cartridges, 
but denied the motion as to the cartridges Lexmark sold abroad. Both parties appealed. 
The Federal Circuit considered the appeals en banc and ruled for Lexmark with respect to both 
groups of cartridges. The court began with the Return Program cartridges that Lexmark sold in the 
United States. Relying on its decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F. 2d 700 (1992), 
the Federal Circuit held that a patentee may sell an item and retain the right to enforce, through 
patent infringement lawsuits, “clearly communicated, . . . lawful restriction[s] as to post-sale use 
or resale.” The exhaustion doctrine, the court reasoned, derives from the prohibition on making, 
using, selling, or importing items “without authority.” When you purchase an item you 
presumptively also acquire the authority to use or resell the item freely, but that is just a 
presumption; the same authority does not run with the item when the seller restricts post-sale use 
or resale. Because the parties agreed that Impression Products knew about Lexmark’s restrictions 
and that those restrictions did not violate any laws, the Federal Circuit concluded that Lexmark’s 
sales had not exhausted all of its patent rights, and that the company could sue for infringement 
when Impression Products refurbished and resold Return Program cartridges. 
Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Hughes, dissented. In their view, selling the Return Program 
cartridges in the United States exhausted Lexmark’s patent rights in those items because any 
“authorized sale of a patented article . . . free[s] the article from any restrictions on use or sale 
based on the patent laws.”  
[The Court’s discussion of international exhaustion is contained in Part F, below] 




First up are the Return Program cartridges that Lexmark sold in the United States. We conclude 
that Lexmark exhausted its patent rights in these cartridges the moment it sold them. The single-
use/no-resale restrictions in Lexmark’s contracts with customers may have been clear and 
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enforceable under contract law, but they do not entitle Lexmark to retain patent rights in an item 
that it has elected to sell. 
The Patent Act grants patentees the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling [their] invention[s].” 35 U. S. C. §154(a). For over 160 years, the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion has imposed a limit on that right to exclude. The limit functions automatically: When 
a patentee chooses to sell an item, that product “is no longer within the limits of the monopoly” 
and instead becomes the “private, individual property” of the purchaser, with the rights and 
benefits that come along with ownership. A patentee is free to set the price and negotiate contracts 
with purchasers, but may not, “by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition” of the product 
after ownership passes to the purchaser. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 250 
(1942). The sale “terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, Inc., 553 U. S. 617, 625 (2008). 
This well-established exhaustion rule marks the point where patent rights yield to the common 
law principle against restraints on alienation. The Patent Act “promote[s] the progress of science 
and the useful arts by granting to [inventors] a limited monopoly” that allows them to “secure the 
financial rewards” for their inventions. But once a patentee sells an item, it has “enjoyed all the 
rights secured” by that limited monopoly. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S. 659, 661 
(1895). Because “the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled . . . when the patentee has received his 
reward for the use of his invention,” that law furnishes “no basis for restraining the use and 
enjoyment of the thing sold.” Univis, 316 U. S., at 251. 
This venerable principle is not, as the Federal Circuit dismissively viewed it, merely “one 
common-law jurisdiction’s general judicial policy at one time toward anti-alienation restrictions.” 
Congress enacted and has repeatedly revised the Patent Act against the backdrop of the hostility 
toward restraints on alienation. That enmity is reflected in the exhaustion doctrine. The patent laws 
do not include the right to “restrain[ ] . . .further alienation” after an initial sale; such conditions 
have been “hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours” and are “obnoxious to the public 
interest.” Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490, 501 (1917). “The inconvenience 
and annoyance to the public that an opposite conclusion would occasion are too obvious to require 
illustration.” Keeler, 157 U. S., at 667. 
But an illustration never hurts. Take a shop that restores and sells used cars. The business works 
because the shop can rest assured that, so long as those bringing in the cars own them, the shop is 
free to repair and resell those vehicles. That smooth flow of commerce would sputter if companies 
that make the thousands of parts that go into a vehicle could keep their patent rights after the first 
sale. Those companies might, for instance, restrict resale rights and sue the shop owner for patent 
infringement. And even if they refrained from imposing such restrictions, the very threat of patent 
liability would force the shop to invest in efforts to protect itself from hidden lawsuits. Either way, 
extending the patent rights beyond the first sale would clog the channels of commerce, with little 
benefit from the extra control that the patentees retain. And advances in technology, along with 
increasingly complex supply chains, magnify the problem.  
This Court accordingly has long held that, even when a patentee sells an item under an express 
restriction, the patentee does not retain patent rights in that product. In Boston Store of Chicago v. 
American Graphophone Co., for example, a manufacturer sold graphophones—one of the earliest 
devices for recording and reproducing sounds—to retailers under contracts requiring those stores 
to resell at a specific price. When the manufacturer brought a patent infringement suit against a 
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retailer who sold for less, we concluded that there was “no room for controversy” about the result: 
By selling the item, the manufacturer placed it “beyond the confines of the patent law, [and] could 
not, by qualifying restrictions as to use, keep [it] under the patent monopoly.”  
Two decades later, we confronted a similar arrangement in Univis. There, a company that made 
eyeglass lenses authorized an agent to sell its products to wholesalers and retailers only if they 
promised to market the lenses at fixed prices. The Government filed an antitrust lawsuit, and the 
company defended its arrangement on the ground that it was exercising authority under the Patent 
Act. We held that the initial sales “relinquish[ed] . . . the patent monopoly with respect to the 
article[s] sold,” so the “stipulation . . . fixing resale prices derive[d] no support from the patent and 
must stand on the same footing” as restrictions on unpatented goods.  
It is true that Boston Store and Univis involved resale price restrictions that, at the time of those 
decisions, violated the antitrust laws. But in both cases it was the sale of the items, rather than the 
illegality of the restrictions, that prevented the patentees from enforcing those resale price 
agreements through patent infringement suits. And if there were any lingering doubt that patent 
exhaustion applies even when a sale is subject to an express, otherwise lawful restriction, our 
recent decision in Quanta settled the matter. In that case, a technology company—with 
authorization from the patentee—sold microprocessors under contracts requiring purchasers to use 
those processors with other parts that the company manufactured. One buyer disregarded the 
restriction, and the patentee sued for infringement. Without so much as mentioning the lawfulness 
of the contract, we held that the patentee could not bring an infringement suit because the 
“authorized sale . . . took its products outside the scope of the patent monopoly.” 
Turning to the case at hand, we conclude that this well-settled line of precedent allows for only 
one answer: Lexmark cannot bring a patent infringement suit against Impression Products to 
enforce the single-use/no-resale provision accompanying its Return Program cartridges. Once 
sold, the Return Program cartridges passed outside of the patent monopoly, and whatever rights 
Lexmark retained are a matter of the contracts with its purchasers, not the patent law. 
 
B 
The Federal Circuit reached a different result largely because it got off on the wrong foot. The 
“exhaustion doctrine,” the court believed, “must be understood as an interpretation of ” the 
infringement statute, which prohibits anyone from using or selling a patented article “without 
authority” from the patentee. Exhaustion reflects a default rule that a patentee’s decision to sell an 
item “presumptively grant[s] ‘authority’ to the purchaser to use it and resell it.” But, the Federal 
Circuit explained, the patentee does not have to hand over the full “bundle of rights” every time. 
If the patentee expressly withholds a stick from the bundle—perhaps by restricting the purchaser’s 
resale rights—the buyer never acquires that withheld authority, and the patentee may continue to 
enforce its right to exclude that practice under the patent laws. 
The misstep in this logic is that the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority 
that comes along with a sale; it is instead a limit on “the scope of the patentee’s rights.” United 
States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U. S. 476, 489 (1926). The right to use, sell, or import an item 
exists independently of the Patent Act. What a patent adds—and grants exclusively to the 
patentee—is a limited right to prevent others from engaging in those practices. Exhaustion 
extinguishes that exclusionary power. As a result, the sale transfers the right to use, sell, or import 
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because those are the rights that come along with ownership, and the buyer is free and clear of an 
infringement lawsuit because there is no exclusionary right left to enforce. 
The Federal Circuit also expressed concern that preventing patentees from reserving patent 
rights when they sell goods would create an artificial distinction between such sales and sales by 
licensees. Patentees, the court explained, often license others to make and sell their products, and 
may place restrictions on those licenses. A computer developer could, for instance, license a 
manufacturer to make its patented devices and sell them only for non-commercial use by 
individuals. If a licensee breaches the license by selling a computer for commercial use, the 
patentee can sue the licensee for infringement. And, in the Federal Circuit’s view, our decision in 
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U. S. 175 (1938), established that—
when a patentee grants a license “under clearly stated restrictions on post-sale activities” of those 
who purchase products from the licensee—the patentee can also sue for infringement those 
purchasers who knowingly violate the restrictions. If patentees can employ licenses to impose post-
sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable through infringement suits, the court concluded, 
it would make little sense to prevent patentees from doing so when they sell directly to consumers. 
The Federal Circuit’s concern is misplaced. A patentee can impose restrictions on licensees 
because a license does not implicate the same concerns about restraints on alienation as a sale. 
Patent exhaustion reflects the principle that, when an item passes into commerce, it should not be 
shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through the marketplace. But a license is not about 
passing title to a product, it is about changing the contours of the patentee’s monopoly: The 
patentee agrees not to exclude a licensee from making or selling the patented invention, expanding 
the club of authorized producers and sellers. Because the patentee is exchanging rights, not goods, 
it is free to relinquish only a portion of its bundle of patent protections. 
A patentee’s authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit thought, mean that 
patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable 
through the patent laws. So long as a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the 
patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale. That licensee’s sale is treated, for purposes of patent 
exhaustion, as if the patentee made the sale itself. The result: The sale exhausts the patentee’s 
rights in that item. A license may require the licensee to impose a restriction on purchasers, like 
the license limiting the computer manufacturer to selling for non-commercial use by individuals. 
But if the licensee does so—by, perhaps, having each customer sign a contract promising not to 
use the computers in business—the sale nonetheless exhausts all patent rights in the item sold. The 
purchasers might not comply with the restriction, but the only recourse for the licensee is through 
contract law, just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction. 
General Talking Pictures involved a fundamentally different situation: There, a licensee 
“knowingly ma[de] . . . sales . . . outside the scope of its license.” We treated the sale “as if no 
license whatsoever had been granted” by the patentee, which meant that the patentee could sue 
both the licensee and the purchaser—who knew about the breach—for infringement. This does not 
mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restraints on purchasers. Quite the 
contrary: The licensee infringed the patentee’s rights 
because it did not comply with the terms of its license, 
and the patentee could bring a patent suit against the 
purchaser only because the purchaser participated in the 
licensee’s infringement. General Talking Pictures, then, 
if a patentee has not given 
authority for a licensee to make 
a sale, that sale cannot exhaust 
the patentee’s rights 
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stands for the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given authority for a licensee to make a 
sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s rights. 
In sum, patent exhaustion is uniform and automatic. Once a patentee decides to sell—whether 
on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale 
restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through a license. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Post-Sale Restrictions. Cases like Mallinckrodt and Impression Products revolve around 
the desire of a patent holder to impose restrictions on users of patented articles after their first sale.  
As a general matter, why do patent holders wish to impose such restrictions after they have been 
compensated for the sale of a patented article?  Do you think this approach is more common in 
certain types of industries? 
2. Infringement versus Breach of Contract.  In many cases, patent holders who impose post-
sale restrictions on purchasers of patented products seek to enforce these restrictions as a matter 
of patent law (i.e., the user who fails to comply is infringing the patent) rather than as a breach of 
contract.  Why?  What role does privity of contract play in this calculation? 
3. Choice of Defendant.  In Mallinckrodt, the patent holder chose to sue the party who 
sterilized and reconditioned used UltraVent devices rather than the hospitals who used the devices 
in violation of the single-use restriction.  Why?  Would there be any advantages to suing the 
hospitals themselves? 
4. The Smooth Flow of Commerce. The Supreme Court in Impression Products reasons that 
the “smooth flow of commerce would sputter if companies that make the thousands of parts that 
go into a vehicle could keep their patent rights after the first sale.” What does this mean?  Is this 
conclusion true with respect to all types of products and services, or is it specific to reusable items 
like printer ink cartridges? 
5. The End of Post-Sale Restrictions?  Many commentators have questioned whether Quanta, 
and then Impression Products, effectively overrule Mallinckrodt, thus eliminating a patent holder’s 
ability to impose post-sale restrictions on patented products as a matter of patent law (i.e., 
disregarding the purely contractual restrictions discussed in Footnote 7 of Quanta).  What do you 
think?  Are there any post-sale restrictions that survive Quanta, and then Impression Products?  
Did Impression Products close any loopholes potentially left open by Quanta? 
6. Copyright versus Patent.  How does the Supreme Court’s reasoning in patent exhaustion 
cases like Quanta and Impression Products contrast with the lower courts’ treatment of 
copyrighted works under cases such as Bobbs-Merrill and Vernor?  Is the difference more about 
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F. INTERNATIONAL FIRST SALE, EXHAUSTION AND GRAY MARKETS 
In the cases discussed so far, we have largely focused on patents and sales of patented products 
in the United States.  As they usually do, things become more complicated once we introduce the 
international distribution of products into the mix.  Yet, given the global nature of many product 
markets – from tennis shoes and designer handbags to films and recorded music to smartphones 
and microchips, a consideration of international issues is unavoidable in any conscientious 
treatment of exhaustion issues. International issues can arise with respect to all types of IP. In this 
chapter we will consider cases (one of which you have seen before) that have defined the law in 
this area. 
 
1. International First Sale and Copyrights 
 
KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 
568 US 519 ( 2013) 
 
BREYER, JUSTICE 
 Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright under this title” certain 
“exclusive rights,” including the right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership.” 17 U. S. C. §106(3). These rights are qualified, 
however, by the application of various limitations [including] the “first sale” doctrine (§109). 
 Section 109(a) sets forth the “first sale” doctrine as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the section that grants the owner 
exclusive distribution rights], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or  phonorecord. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, even though §106(3) forbids distribution of a copy of, say, the copyrighted novel Herzog 
without the copyright owner’s permission, §109(a) adds that, once a copy of Herzog has been 
lawfully sold (or its ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the buyer of that copy and 
subsequent owners are free to dispose of it as they wish. In copyright jargon, the “first sale” has 
“exhausted” the copyright owner’s §106(3) exclusive distribution right. 
 What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad and then initially sold with the 
copyright owner’s permission? Does the “first sale” doctrine still apply? Is the buyer, like the buyer 
of a domestically manufactured copy, free to bring the copy into the United States and dispose of 
it as he or she wishes? 
 To put the matter technically, an “importation” provision, §602(a)(1), says that 
“[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of 
copyright under this title, of copies . . . of a work that have been acquired outside 
the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies . . . 
under section 106 . . . .” 17 U. S. C. §602(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
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Thus §602(a)(1) makes clear that importing a copy without permission violates the owner’s 
exclusive distribution right. But in doing so, §602(a)(1) refers explicitly to the §106(3) exclusive 
distribution right. As we have just said, §106 is by its terms “[s]ubject to” … §109(a)’s “first sale” 
limitation. Do those same modifications apply—in particular, does the “first sale” modification 
apply—when considering whether §602(a)(1) prohibits importing a copy? 
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U. S. 135, 145 (1998), 
we held that §602(a)(1)’s reference to §106(3)’s exclusive distribution right incorporates the later 
subsections’ limitations, including, in particular, the “first sale” doctrine of §109. Thus, it might 
seem that, §602(a)(1) notwithstanding, one who buys a copy abroad can freely import that copy 
into the United States and dispose of it, just as he could had he bought the copy in the United 
States. 
But Quality King considered an instance in which the copy, though purchased abroad, was 
initially manufactured in the United States (and then sent abroad and sold). This case is like Quality 
King but for one important fact. The copies at issue here were manufactured abroad. That fact is 
important because §109(a) says that the “first sale” doctrine applies to “a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title.” And we must decide here whether the five words, 
“lawfully made under this title,” make a critical legal difference. 
Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” doctrine applies to protect 
a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. 
Can that buyer bring that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining 
permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, someone who purchases, say at 
a used bookstore, a book printed abroad subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s 
permission? 
In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. We hold that the “first sale” doctrine 




 Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., publishes academic textbooks. Wiley obtains from 
its authors various foreign and domestic copyright assignments, licenses and  permissions—to the 
point that we can, for present purposes, refer to Wiley as the relevant American copyright owner. 
Wiley often assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., 
rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. Each copy of a Wiley 
Asia foreign edition will likely contain language making clear that the copy is to be sold only in a 
particular country or geographical region outside the United States.  
 For example, a copy of Wiley’s American edition says, “Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. All rights reserved. . . . Printed in the United States of America.” A copy of Wiley Asia’s 
Asian edition of that book says: 
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd[.] All rights reserved. This 
book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East only and 
may be not exported out of these territories. Exportation from or importation of this 
book to another region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a 
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violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Publisher may take legal action to enforce 
its rights. . . . Printed in Asia. 
Both the foreign and the American copies say: 
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 
transmitted in any form or by any means . . . except as permitted under Sections 
107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act. 
The upshot is that there are two essentially equivalent versions of a Wiley textbook, each 
version manufactured and sold with Wiley’s permission: (1) an American version printed and sold 
in the United States, and (2) a foreign version manufactured and sold abroad. And Wiley makes 
certain that copies of the second version state that they are not to be taken (without permission) 




Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United States in 1997 to study 
mathematics at Cornell University. He paid for his education with the help of a Thai Government 
scholarship which required him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on his return. Kirtsaeng 
successfully completed his undergraduate courses at Cornell, successfully completed a Ph.D 
program in mathematics at the University of Southern California, and then, as promised, returned 
to Thailand to teach. While he was studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and 
family in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition English-language textbooks at Thai book shops, 
where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him in the United States. Kirtsaeng would then 
sell them, reimburse his family and friends, and keep the profit. 
 
J. Walker, Fundamentals of Physics 
(Wiley, 8th ed. (U.S.): 2008) – one of the 
textbooks at issue in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley 
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Supap Kirtsaeng  
[photo: Doug Kari, Ars Technica, 11/25/14] 
 
B 
In 2008 Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. Wiley 
claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation of its books and his later resale of those books 
amounted to an infringement of Wiley’s §106(3) exclusive right to dis- tribute as well as §602’s 
related import prohibition. Kirtsaeng replied that the books he had acquired were “ ‘lawfully made’ 
” and that he had acquired them legitimately. Thus, in his view, §109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine 
permitted him to resell or otherwise dispose of the books without the copyright owner’s further 
permission. 
The District Court held that Kirtsaeng could not assert the “first sale” defense because, in its 
view, that doctrine does not apply to “foreign-manufactured goods” (even if made abroad with the 
copyright owner’s permission). The jury then found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s 
American copyrights by selling and importing without authorization copies of eight of Wiley’s 
copyrighted titles. And it assessed statutory damages of $600,000 ($75,000 per work). 
On appeal, a split panel of the Second Circuit agreed with the District Court. It pointed out that 
§109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine applies only to “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made 
under this title.” (emphasis added). And, in the majority’s view, this language means that the “first 
sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad.  
We granted Kirtsaeng’s petition for certiorari to consider this question in light of different 
views among the Circuits.  
 
II 
We must decide whether the words “lawfully made under this title” restrict the scope of 
§109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine geographically. The Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, Wiley, and 
the Solicitor General (as amicus) all read those words as imposing a form of geographical 
limitation. The Second Circuit held that they limit the “first sale” doctrine to particular copies 
“made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law,” which (the Circuit says) are copies 
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“manufactured domestically,” not “outside of the United States.” Wiley agrees that those five 
words limit the “first sale” doctrine “to copies made in conformance with the [United States] 
Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable,” which (Wiley says) means it does not apply 
to copies made “outside the United States” and at least not to “foreign production of a copy for 
distribution exclusively abroad.” Similarly, the Solicitor General says that those five words limit 
the “first sale” doctrine’s applicability to copies “ ‘made subject to and in compliance with [the 
Copyright Act],’ ” which (the Solicitor General says) are copies “made in the United States.” And 
the Ninth Circuit has held that those words limit the “first sale” doctrine’s applicability (1) to 
copies lawfully made in the United States, and (2) to copies lawfully made outside the United 
States but initially sold in the United States with the copyright owner’s permission.  
Under any of these geographical interpretations, §109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine would not apply 
to the Wiley Asia books at issue here. And, despite an American copyright owner’s permission to 
make copies abroad, one who buys a copy of any such book or other copyrighted work—whether 
at a retail store, over the Internet, or at a library sale—could not resell (or otherwise dispose of) 
that particular copy without further permission. 
Kirtsaeng, however, reads the words “lawfully made under this title” as imposing a non-
geographical limitation. He says that they mean made “in accordance with” or “in compliance 
with” the Copyright Act. In that case, §109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine would apply to copyrighted 
works as long as their manufacture met the requirements of American copyright law. In particular, 
the doctrine would apply where, as here, copies are manufactured abroad with the permission of 
the copyright owner. 
In our view, §109(a)’s language, its context, and the common-law history of the “first sale” 
doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical interpretation. We also doubt that Congress 
would have intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical 
interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and consumer activities. See 
Part II–D, infra. We consequently conclude that Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical reading is the better 
reading of the Act. 
 
B 
 [W]e normally presume that the words “lawfully made under this title” carry the same 
meaning when they appear in different but related sections. But doing so here produces surprising 
consequences. Consider: 
(1) Section 109(c) says that, despite the copyright owner’s exclusive right “to display” a 
copyrighted work (provided in §106(5)), the owner of a particular copy “lawfully made under this 
title” may publicly display it without further authorization. To interpret these words geographically 
would mean that one who buys a copyrighted work of art, a poster, or even a bumper sticker, in 
Canada, in Europe, in Asia, could not display it in America without the copyright owner’s further 
authorization. 
 (2) Section 109(e) specifically provides that the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted 
video arcade game “lawfully made under this title” may “publicly perform or display that game in 
coin-operated equipment” without the authorization of the copyright owner. To interpret these 
words geographically means that an arcade owner could not (“without the authority of the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697559
Contreras IP Licensing and Transactions Chapter 23 
 52 
copyright owner”) perform or display arcade games (whether new or used) originally made in 
Japan. 
(3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copyright owner’s authorization, is allowed 
to perform or display a copyrighted work (say, an audiovisual work) “in the course of face-to-face 
teaching activities”—unless the teacher knowingly used “a copy that was not law- fully made 
under this title.” To interpret these words geographically would mean that the teacher could not 
(without further authorization) use a copy of a film during class if the copy was lawfully made in 
Canada, Mexico, Europe, Africa, or Asia. 
 
C 
 A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a nongeographical reading. “[W]hen a 
statute covers an issue previously governed by the common law,” we must presume that “Congress 
intended to retain the substance of the common law.”  
 The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree. In 
the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the 
alienation of chattels: A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other 
disposition of a chattel once sold is … “against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and 
contracting.”  
 With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance of leaving buyers of goods free 
to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods. American law 
too has generally thought that competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage 
of the consumer.  
 The “first sale” doctrine also frees courts from the administrative burden of trying to enforce 
restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily movable goods. And it avoids the selective enforcement 
inherent in any such effort. Thus, it is not surprising that for at least a century the “first sale” 
doctrine has played an important role in American copyright law. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 
210 U. S. 339 (1908). 
 The common-law doctrine makes no geographical distinctions; nor can we find any in 
Bobbs-Merrill (where this Court first applied the “first sale” doctrine) or in §109(a)’s predecessor 
provision, which Congress enacted a year later. Rather, as the Solicitor General acknowledges, a 
straightforward application of Bobbs-Merrill would not preclude the “first sale” defense from 
applying to authorized copies made overseas. And we can find no language, context, purpose, or 
history that would rebut a “straightforward application” of that doctrine here. 
 
D 
Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, 
and museums point to various ways in which a geographical interpretation would fail to further 
basic constitutional copyright objectives, in particular “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
The American Library Association tells us that library collections contain at least 200 million 
books published abroad; that many others were first published in the United States but printed 
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abroad because of lower costs; and that a geographical interpretation will likely require the libraries 
to obtain permission (or at least create significant uncertainty) before circulating or otherwise 
distributing these books. 
How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to obtain permission to distribute 
these millions of books? How can they find, say, the copyright owner of a foreign book, perhaps 
written decades ago? They may not know the copyright holder’s present address. And, even where 
addresses can be found, the costs of finding them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be high 
indeed. Are the libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of books in 
their collections that were printed abroad? 
Used-book dealers tell us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson 
built commercial and personal libraries of foreign books, American readers have bought used 
books published and printed abroad. The dealers say that they have “operat[ed] . . . for centuries” 
under the assumption that the “first sale” doctrine applies. But under a geographical interpretation 
a contemporary  tourist who buys, say, at Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen copies of a 
foreign book for American friends might find that she had violated the copyright law. The used-
book dealers cannot easily predict what the foreign copyright holder may think about a reader’s 
effort to sell a used copy of a novel. And they believe that a geographical interpretation will injure 
a large portion of the used-book business. 
Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, 
tablets, and personal computers” contain copyrightable software programs or packaging. Many of 
these items are made abroad with the American copyright holder’s permission and then sold and 
imported (with that permission) to the United States. A geographical interpretation would prevent 
the resale of, say, a car, without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of 
copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto manufacturers 
regularly obtain this kind of permission from their software component suppliers, and Wiley did 
not indicate to the contrary when asked. Without that permission a foreign car owner could not 
sell his or her used car. 
Retailers tell us that over $2.3 trillion worth of foreign goods were imported in 2011. American 
retailers buy many of these goods after a first sale abroad. And, many of these items bear, carry, 
or contain copyrighted “packaging, logos, labels, and product inserts and instructions for [the use 
of] everyday packaged goods from floor cleaners and health and beauty products to breakfast 
cereals.” The retailers add that American sales of more  traditional copyrighted works, “such as 
books, recorded music, motion pictures, and magazines” likely amount to over $220 billion. A 
geographical interpretation would subject many, if not all, of them to the disruptive impact of the 
threat of infringement suits.  
Art museum directors ask us to consider their efforts to display foreign-produced works by, 
say, Cy Twombly, René Magritte, Henri Matisse, Pablo Picasso, and others. A geographical 
interpretation, they say, would require the museums to obtain permission from the copyright 
owners before they could display the work —even if the copyright owner has already sold or 
donated the work to a foreign museum. What are the museums to do, they ask, if the artist retained 
the copyright, if the artist cannot be found, or if a group of heirs is arguing about who owns which 
copyright?  
Neither Wiley nor any of its many amici deny that a geographical interpretation could bring 
about these “horribles”—at least in principle. Rather, Wiley essentially says that the list is 
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artificially invented. It points out that a federal court first adopted a geographical interpretation 
more than 30 years ago. Yet, it adds, these problems have not occurred. Why not? Because, says 
Wiley, the problems and threats are purely theoretical; they are unlikely to reflect reality.  
[T]he fact that harm has proved limited so far may simply reflect the reluctance of copyright 
holders so far to assert geographically based resale rights. They may decide differently if the law 
is clarified in their favor. Regardless, a copyright law that can work in practice only if unenforced 
is not a sound copyright law. It is a law that would create uncertainty, would bring about selective 
enforcement, and, if widely unenforced, would breed disrespect for copyright law itself. 
Thus, we believe that the practical problems that petitioner and his amici have described are 
too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—
particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. The upshot is that 
copyright-related consequences along with language, context, and interpretive canons argue 
strongly against a geographical interpretation of §109(a). 
 
IV 
 For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting Kirtsaeng’s 
nongeographical interpretation of the words “lawfully made under this title” are the more 
persuasive. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
2. International Patent Exhaustion 
 
IMPRESSION PRODUCTS, INC. V. LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
581 U.S. ___ (2017) 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
[The case background and a discussion of exhaustion, generally, are contained in Part E, 
above] 
 
Our conclusion that Lexmark exhausted its patent rights when it sold the domestic Return 
Program cartridges goes only halfway to resolving this case. Lexmark also sold toner cartridges 
abroad and sued Impression Products for patent infringement for “importing [Lexmark’s]invention 
into the United States.” 35 U. S. C. §154(a). Lexmark contends that it may sue for infringement 
with respect to all of the imported cartridges—not just those in the Return Program—because a 
foreign sale does not trigger patent exhaustion unless the patentee “expressly or implicitly 
transfer[s] or license[s]” its rights. The Federal Circuit agreed, but we do not. An authorized sale 
outside the United States, just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the Patent 
Act. This question about international exhaustion of intellectual property rights has also arisen in 
the context of copyright law. Under the “first sale doctrine,” which is codified at 17 U. S. C. 
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§109(a), when a copyright owner sells a lawfully made copy of its work, it loses the power to 
restrict the purchaser’s freedom “to sell or otherwise dispose of . . . that copy.” In Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., we held that this “‘first sale’ [rule] applies to copies of a copyrighted 
work lawfully made [and sold] abroad.” We began with the text of §109(a), but it was not decisive: 
The language neither “restrict[s] the scope of [the] ‘first sale’ doctrine geographically,” nor clearly 
embraces international exhaustion. What helped tip the scales for global exhaustion was the fact 
that the first sale doctrine originated in the common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the 
alienation of chattels. That common-law doctrine makes no geographical distinctions. The lack of 
any textual basis for distinguishing between domestic and international sales meant that “a 
straightforward application” of the first sale doctrine required the conclusion that it applies 
overseas. 
 
   
Lexmark’s laser printer cartridges helped to establish the law of international patent exhaustion 
 
Applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales is just as straightforward. Patent exhaustion, too, 
has its roots in the antipathy toward restraints on alienation, and nothing in the text or history of 
the Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that borderless common law principle to 
domestic sales. In fact, Congress has not altered patent exhaustion at all; it remains an unwritten 
limit on the scope of the patentee’s monopoly. And differentiating the patent exhaustion and 
copyright first sale doctrines would make little theoretical or practical sense: The two share a 
“strong similarity . . . and identity of purpose,” and many everyday products—“automobiles, 
microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers”—are subject to both 
patent and copyright protections, see Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S., at 545. There is a “historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law,” and the bond between the two leaves no room for a rift on 
the question of international exhaustion. 
Lexmark sees the matter differently. The Patent Act, it points out, limits the patentee’s “right 
to exclude others” from making, using, selling, or importing its products to acts that occur in the 
United States. 35 U. S. C. §154(a). A domestic sale, it argues, triggers exhaustion because the sale 
compensates the patentee for “surrendering [those] U. S. rights.” A foreign sale is different: The 
Patent Act does not give patentees exclusionary powers abroad. Without those powers, a patentee 
selling in a foreign market may not be able to sell its product for the same price that it could in the 
United States, and therefore is not sure to receive “the reward guaranteed by U. S. patent law.” 
Absent that reward, says Lexmark, there should be no exhaustion. In short, there is no patent 
exhaustion from sales abroad because there are no patent rights abroad to exhaust. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697559
Contreras IP Licensing and Transactions Chapter 23 
 56 
The territorial limit on patent rights is, however, no basis for distinguishing copyright 
protections; those protections “do not have any extraterritorial operation” either. Nor does the 
territorial limit support the premise of Lexmark’s argument. Exhaustion is a separate limit on the 
patent grant, and does not depend on the patentee receiving some undefined premium for selling 
the right to access the American market. A purchaser buys an item, not patent rights. And 
exhaustion is triggered by the patentee’s decision to give that item up and receive whatever fee it 
decides is appropriate “for the article and the invention which it embodies.” Univis, 316 U. S., at 
251. The patentee may not be able to command the same amount for its products abroad as it does 
in the United States. But the Patent Act does not guarantee a particular price, much less the price 
from selling to American consumers. Instead, the right to exclude just ensures that the patentee 
receives one reward—of whatever amount the patentee deems to be “satisfactory compensation,” 
Keeler, 157 U. S., at 661—for every item that passes outside the scope of the patent monopoly. 
This Court has addressed international patent exhaustion in only one case, Boesch v. Gräff, 
decided over 125 years ago. All that case illustrates is that a sale abroad does not exhaust a 
patentee’s rights when the patentee had nothing to do with the transaction. Boesch—from the days 
before the widespread adoption of electrical lighting—involved a retailer who purchased lamp 
burners from a manufacturer in Germany, with plans to sell them in the United States. The 
manufacturer had authority to make the burners under German law, but there was a hitch: Two 
individuals with no ties to the German manufacturer held the American patent to that invention. 
These patentees sued the retailer for infringement when the retailer imported the lamp burners into 
the United States, and we rejected the argument that the German manufacturer’s sale had exhausted 
the American patentees’ rights. The German manufacturer had no permission to sell in the United 
States from the American patentees, and the American patentees had not exhausted their patent 
rights in the products because they had not sold them to anyone, so “purchasers from [the German 
manufacturer] could not be thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United States.” 133 U. S. 
697, 703 (1890). 
Our decision did not, as Lexmark contends, exempt all foreign sales from patent exhaustion. 
Rather, it reaffirmed the basic premise that only the patentee can decide whether to make a sale 
that exhausts its patent rights in an item. The American patentees did not do so with respect to the 
German products, so the German sales did not exhaust their rights. 
Finally, the United States, as an amicus, advocates what it views as a middle-ground position: 
that “a foreign sale authorized by the U. S. patentee exhausts U. S. patent rights unless those rights 
are expressly reserved.” Its position is largely based on policy rather than principle. The 
Government thinks that an overseas “buyer’s legitimate expectation” is that a “sale conveys all of 
the seller’s interest in the patented article,” so the presumption should be that a foreign sale triggers 
exhaustion. But, at the same time, lower courts long ago coalesced around the rule that “a 
patentee’s express reservation of U.S. patent rights at the time of a foreign sale will be given 
effect,” so that option should remain open to the patentee.  
The theory behind the Government’s express-reservation rule also wrongly focuses on the 
likely expectations of the patentee and purchaser during a sale. Exhaustion does not arise because 
of the parties’ expectations about how sales transfer patent rights. More is at stake when it comes 
to patents than simply the dealings between the parties, which can be addressed through contract 
law. Instead, exhaustion occurs because, in a sale, the patentee elects to give up title to an item in 
exchange for payment. Allowing patent rights to stick remora-like to that item as it flows through 
the market would violate the principle against restraints on alienation. Exhaustion does not depend 
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on whether the patentee receives a premium for selling in the United States, or the type of rights 
that buyers expect to receive. As a result, restrictions and location are irrelevant; what matters is 
the patentee’s decision to make a sale. 
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in the Court’s holding regarding domestic exhaustion—a patentee who sells a product 
with an express restriction on reuse or resale may not enforce that restriction through an 
infringement lawsuit, because the U.S. sale exhausts the U.S. patent rights in the product sold. I 
dissent, however, from the Court’s holding on international exhaustion. A foreign sale, I would 
hold, does not exhaust a U.S. inventor’s U.S. patent rights. Patent law is territorial. When an 
inventor receives a U.S. patent, that patent provides no protection abroad. A U.S. patentee must 
apply to each country in which she seeks the exclusive right to sell her invention.  
Because a sale abroad operates independently of the U.S. patent system, it makes little sense 
to say that such a sale exhausts an inventor’s U.S. patent rights. U.S. patent protection accompanies 
none of a U.S. patentee’s sales abroad—a competitor could sell the same patented product abroad 
with no U.S.-patent-law consequence. Accordingly, the foreign sale should not diminish the 
protections of U.S. law in the United States. 
The majority disagrees, in part because this Court decided, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 525 (2013), that a foreign sale exhausts U. S. copyright protections. Copyright 
and patent exhaustion, the majority states, “share a strong similarity.” I dissented from our decision 
in Kirtsaeng and adhere to the view that a foreign sale should not exhaust U.S. copyright 
protections.  
But even if I subscribed to Kirtsaeng’s reasoning with respect to copyright, that decision should 
bear little weight in the patent context. Although there may be a “historical kinship” between patent 
law and copyright law, the two “are not identical twins”. The Patent Act contains no analogue to 
17 U.S.C. §109(a), the Copyright Act first-sale provision analyzed in Kirtsaeng. More importantly, 
copyright protections, unlike patent protections, are harmonized across countries. Under the Berne 
Convention, which 174 countries have joined, members “agree to treat authors from other member 
countries as well as they treat their own.” The copyright protections one receives abroad are thus 
likely to be similar to those received at home, even if provided under each country’s separate 
copyright regime. 
For these reasons, I would affirm the Federal Circuit’s judgment with respect to foreign 
exhaustion. 
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in both Kirtsaeng and Impression Products  
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Statutory Interpretation.  Justice Breyer’s analysis in Kirtsaeng focuses in excruciating 
detail on the language of Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act – the statutory codification of the 
first sale doctrine. Yet Chief Justice Roberts hardly considers statutory language at all in 
Impression Products.  Why is there such a difference in approach as between copyright and patent 
law with respect to international exhaustion? 
2. Copyright versus Patent.  Despite the difference in approach discussed in Note 1 above, 
Chief Justice Roberts relies in his reasoning in Impression Products on the “historical kinship” 
between patent law and copyright law.  Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, argues that the two “are not 
identical twins”.  What is the crux of this disagreement between the justices?  Which view of the 
relationship between patent and copyright law do you consider to be stronger?   
 
 
3. International Trademark Exhaustion and the Gray Market 
As discussed in Part C, “genuine” trademarked goods may be resold without the authorization 
of the trademark owner.  This is also the case internationally.  An overseas purchaser of an 
authorized marked product may import it into the United States so long as the foreign product is 
“genuine”, or manufactured under authority of the mark owner.  Take the example of Nike athletic 
shoes.  Nike may authorize a manufacturer in Thailand to manufacture a particular type of branded 
shoe.  Under its contract with Nike, the Thai manufacturer may then sell those shoes for $20 per 
pair to Nike’s authorized wholesalers, who distribute them to retailers in the U.S. who sell them to 
consumers for $150 per pair.  But suppose that the Thai manufacturer makes a few extra shoes and 
sells them at $30 per pair to discount Nike retailers in the U.S., who then sell them to consumers 
for $50 per pair?  It is possible that the Thai manufacturer is violating its contract with Nike, but 
can Nike prevent the sale of the shoes by the discount retailers in the U.S. under trademark law if 
they are the exact same shoes that authorized resellers are selling for $150?  This scenario 
illustrates what is called the “gray market” for trademarked goods. 
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Flow of goods in the “gray market” 
 
You will note the similarities in this scenario to those described in Kirtsaeng and Impression 
Products. Yet trademark law was the first place in which international exhaustion was recognized 
– long before the Supreme Court intervened in the copyright and patent areas.   
The key question in international trademark exhaustion cases is whether the imported goods 
are, in fact, “genuine”, as trademark law does not extend to the sale of genuine goods. But as the 
Third Circuit explained in Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 1998), where 
imported goods are marketed under identical marks but are materially different, the alleged 
infringer’s goods are considered ‘non-genuine’ and the sale of the goods constitutes infringement. 
This leads, naturally, to the question of what constitutes a “material difference” for purposes of 
international trademark exhaustion. The question has attracted significant attention and is 
addressed in detail in the following case. 
 
SOCIETE DES PRODUITS NESTLE, S.A. V. CASA HELVETIA, INC. 
982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992) 
 
SELYA, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
This bittersweet appeal requires us to address the protection that trademark law affords a 
registrant against the importation and sale of so-called "gray goods," that is, trademarked goods 
manufactured abroad under a valid license but brought into this country in derogation of 
arrangements lawfully made by the trademark holder to ensure territorial exclusivity. As we 
explain below, the scope of protection turns on the degree of difference between the product 
authorized for the domestic market and the allegedly infringing product. In the case before us, the 
difference is sufficiently marked that the domestic product warrants protection.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
PERUGINA chocolates originated in Italy and continue to be manufactured there. They are 
sold throughout the world and cater to a sophisticated consumer, a refined palate, and an indulgent 
budget. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle S.P.N.) owns the PERUGINA trademark.  
For many years, defendant-appellee Casa Helvetia, Inc. was the authorized distributor of 
PERUGINA chocolates in Puerto Rico. On November 28, 1988, however, Nestle S.P.N. forsook 
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Casa Helvetia and licensed its affiliate, Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc. (Nestle P.R.), as the exclusive 
Puerto Rican distributor. 
At this point, the plot thickened. Nestle S.P.N. had previously licensed an independent 
company, Distribuidora Nacional de Alimentos La Universal S.A. (Alimentos), to manufacture 
and sell chocolates bearing the PERUGINA mark in Venezuela. The Venezuelan sweets differ 
from the Italian sweets in presentation, variety, composition, and price. In March 1990, without 
obtaining Nestle S.P.N.'s consent, Casa Helvetia began to purchase the Venezuelan-made 
chocolates through a middleman, import them into Puerto Rico, and distribute them under the 




This maneuver drew a swift response. Charging that Casa Helvetia's marketing of the 
Venezuelan candies infringed both Nestle S.P.N.'s registered trademark and Nestle P.R.'s right of 
exclusive distributorship, Nestle S.P.N. and Nestle P.R. (hereinafter collectively "Nestle") sued 
under the Lanham Act. They claimed that Casa Helvetia's use of the PERUGINA label was "likely 
to confuse consumers into the mistaken belief that the Venezuelan chocolates are the same as the 
Italian chocolates and are authorized by Nestle for sale in Puerto Rico." And, they asserted that, 
because the PERUGINA name in Puerto Rico is associated with Italian-made chocolates, the 
importation of materially different Venezuelan chocolates threatened to erode "the integrity of the 
PERUGINA trademarks as symbols of consistent quality and goodwill in Puerto Rico."  
The district court consolidated the hearing on preliminary injunction with the hearing on the 
merits, and, after taking testimony, ruled in the  defendants' favor. It held that the differences 
between the Italian-made and Venezuelan-made candies did not warrant injunctive relief in the 
absence of demonstrated consumer dissatisfaction, harm to plaintiffs' good will, or drop-off in 
product quality.  This appeal followed. 
 
II. THE LANHAM ACT CLAIMS 
Two amaranthine principles fuel the Lanham Act. One aims at protecting consumers. The other 
focuses on protecting registrants and their assignees. These interlocking principles, in turn, are 
linked to a concept of territorial exclusivity. 
1. Animating Principles. Every product is composed of a bundle of special characteristics. The 
consumer who purchases what he believes is the same product expects to receive those special 
characteristics on every occasion. Congress enacted the Lanham Act to realize this expectation 
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with regard to goods bearing a particular trademark. The Act's prophylaxis operates not only in the 
more obvious cases, involving the sale of inferior goods in derogation of the registrant's mark, but 
also in the less obvious cases, involving the sale of goods different from, although not necessarily 
inferior to, the goods that the customer expected to receive. By guaranteeing consistency, a 
trademark wards off both consumer confusion and possible deceit. 
The system also serves another, equally important, purpose by protecting the trademark 
owner's goodwill. Once again, this protection comprises more than merely stopping the sale of 
inferior goods. Even if an infringer creates a product that rivals or exceeds the quality of the 
registrant's product, the wrongful sale of the unauthorized product may still deprive the registrant 
of his ability to shape the contours of his reputation.  
2. Territoriality. In general, trademark rights are congruent with the boundaries of the 
sovereign that registers (or recognizes) the mark. Such territoriality reinforces the basic goals of 
trademark law. Because products are often tailored to specific national conditions, see Lever Bros. 
Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a trademark's reputation (and, hence, its 
goodwill) often differs from nation to nation. Because that is so, the importation of goods properly 
trademarked abroad but not intended for sale locally may confuse consumers and may well threaten 
the local mark owner's goodwill. It is not surprising, then, that  the United States Supreme Court 
long ago recognized the territoriality of trademark rights.  
Of course, territoriality only goes so far. By and large, courts do not read [prior cases] to 
disallow the lawful importation of identical foreign goods carrying a valid foreign trademark. See, 
e.g., NEC Elecs., Inc. v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 
(1987).  Be that as it may, territorial protection kicks in under the Lanham Act where two 
merchants sell physically different products in the same market and under the same name, for it is 
this prototype that impinges on a trademark holder's goodwill and threatens to deceive consumers. 
Indeed, without such territorial trademark protection, competitors purveying country-specific 
products could exploit consumer confusion and free ride on the goodwill of domestic trademarks 
with impunity. Such a scenario would frustrate the underlying goals of the Lanham Act, the "plain 
language and general sweep" of which "undeniably bespeak an intention to protect domestic 
trademark holders." Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 105. Thus, where material differences exist between 
similarly marked goods, the Lanham Act honors the important linkage between trademark law and 
geography. 
In this case … liability necessarily turns on the existence vel non of material differences 
between the products of a sort likely to create consumer confusion. Because the presence or 
absence of a material difference -- a difference likely to cause consumer confusion -- is the pivotal 
determinant of Lanham Act infringement in a gray goods case, the lower court's insistence on 
several other evidentiary showings was inappropriate. 
 
III. THE MATERIALITY THRESHOLD 
When a trial court misperceives and misapplies the law, remand may or may not be essential. 
Here, a final judgment under the correct rule of law requires only the determination of whether 
reported differences between the Venezuelan and Italian products are material. It follows, then, 
that we must examine the legal standard for materiality before deciding whether to remand. 
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Under the Lanham Act, only those appropriations of a mark that are likely to cause confusion 
are prohibited. Ergo, when a product identical to a domestic product is imported into the United 
States under the same mark, no violation of the Lanham Act occurs. In such a situation, consumers 
get exactly the bundle of characteristics that they associate with the mark and the domestic 
distributor can be said to enjoy in large measure his investment in goodwill. By the same token, 
using the same mark on two blatantly different products normally does not offend the Lanham Act, 
for such use is unlikely to cause confusion and is, therefore, unlikely to imperil the goodwill of 
either product. 
The probability of confusion is great, however, when the same mark is displayed on goods that 
are not identical but that nonetheless bear strong similarities in appearance or function. Gray goods 
often fall within this category. Thus, when dealing with the importation of gray goods, a reviewing 
court must necessarily be concerned with subtle differences, for it is by subtle differences that 
consumers are most easily confused. For that reason, the threshold of materiality must be kept low 
enough to take account of potentially confusing differences -- differences that are not blatant 
enough to make it obvious to the average consumer that the origin of the product differs from his 
or her expectations. 
There is no mechanical way to determine the point at which a difference becomes "material." 
Separating wheat from chaff must be done on a case-by-case basis. Bearing in mind the policies 
and provisions of the Lanham Act as they apply to gray goods, we can confidently say that the 
threshold of materiality is always quite low in such cases. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103, 108 
(finding minor differences in ingredients and packaging between versions of deodorant soap to be 
material); Ferrero, 753 F. Supp. at 1241-49, 1247 (finding a one-half calorie difference in 
chemical composition of breath mints, coupled with slight differences in packaging and labeling, 
to be material); PepsiCo Inc. v. Nostalgia, 18 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1405 (finding "differences in 
labeling, packaging and marketing methods" to be material); PepsiCo v. Giraud, 7 U.S.P.Q.2D 
(BNA) at 1373 (finding differences not readily apparent to the consumer -- container volume, 
packaging, quality control, and advertising participation -- to be material); Dial Corp., 643 F. 
Supp. at 952 (finding differences in formulation and packaging of soap products to be material). 
We conclude that the existence of any difference between the registrant's product and the 
allegedly infringing gray good that consumers would likely consider to be relevant when 
purchasing a product creates a presumption of consumer confusion sufficient to support a Lanham 
Act claim. Any higher threshold would endanger a manufacturer's investment in product goodwill 
and unduly subject consumers to potential confusion by severing the tie between a manufacturer's 






The alleged infringer, of course, may attempt to rebut this presumption, but in order to do so 
he must be able to prove by preponderant evidence that the differences are not of the kind that 
consumers, on average, would likely consider in purchasing the product. 
“the existence of any difference between the registrant's product and 
the allegedly infringing gray good that consumers would likely consider 
to be relevant when purchasing a product creates a presumption of 
consumer confusion sufficient to support a Lanham Act claim” 
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IV. MATERIALITY IN THIS CASE 
Having fashioned the standard of materiality and examined the record in light of that standard, 
we are drawn to the conclusion that remand is not required. The district court determined that the 
products are different but that the differences are not material. Although this determination is 
tainted by a misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles, the court's subsidiary findings are, 
nonetheless, reasonably explicit and subject to reuse. Hence, we proceed to take the lower court's 
supportable findings of fact, couple them with other, uncontradicted facts, and, using the rule of 
law articulated above, determine for ourselves whether the admitted differences between the 
Venezuelan-made chocolates and the Italian-made chocolates are sufficiently material to warrant 
injunctive relief.  
 
A. A Catalog of Differences. 
The district court identified numerous differences between the competing products. Because 
the record supports these findings and the parties do not contest their validity, we accept them. We 
add, however, other potentially significant distinctions made manifest by the record. 
1. Quality Control. Although Nestle and Casa Helvetia each oversees the quality of the product 
it sells, the record reflects, and Casa Helvetia concedes, that their procedures differ radically. The 
Italian PERUGINA leaves Italy in refrigerated containers which arrive at Nestle's facility in Puerto 
Rico. Nestle verifies the temperature of the coolers, opens them, and immediately transports the 
chocolates to refrigerated rooms. The company records the product's date of manufacture, conducts 
laboratory tests, and destroys those candies that have expired. It then transports the salable 
chocolates to retailers in refrigerated trucks. Loading and unloading is performed only in the cool 
morning hours. 
On the other hand, the Venezuelan product arrives in Puerto Rico via commercial air freight. 
During the afternoon hours, airline personnel remove the chocolates from the containers in which 
they were imported and place them in a central air cargo cooler. The next morning, employees of 
Casa Helvetia open random boxes at the airport to see if the chocolates have melted. The company 
then transports the candy in a refrigerated van to a warehouse. Casa Helvetia performs periodic 
inspections before delivering the goods to its customers in a refrigerated van. The record contains 
no evidence that Casa Helvetia knows or records the date the chocolates were manufactured.  
 2. Composition. The district court enumerated a number of differences in ingredients. The 
Italian BACI candies have five percent more milk fat than their Venezuelan counterparts, thus 
prolonging shelf life. Furthermore, the Italian BACI chocolates contain Ecuadorian and African 
cocoa beans, fresh hazelnuts, and cooked sugar syrup, whereas the corresponding Venezuelan 
candies are made with domestic beans, imported hazelnuts, and ordinary crystal sugar.   
3. Configuration. The district court specifically noted that the Italian chocolates in the Maitre 
Confiseur and Assortment collections come in a greater variety of shapes than the Venezuelan 
pieces. 
4. Packaging. The district court observed differences in the "boxes, wrappers and trays" 
between the Italian and Venezuelan versions of the various chocolate assortments. For example, 
the packages from Italy possess a glossy finish and are either silver, brown, or gold in color. The 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3697559
Contreras IP Licensing and Transactions Chapter 23 
 64 
Venezuelan boxes lack the shiny finish. They are either blue, red, or yellow in color. While  the 
Italian sweets sit in gold or silver trays, their Venezuelan counterparts rest on white or transparent 
trays. The Italian boxes depict the chocolates inside and describe the product in English, French, 
and Italian. The Venezuelan packages describe the contents only in Spanish and English. 
Moreover, only the BACI box illustrates what is inside. 
5. Price. The district court pointed out that while the Venezuelan and Italian BACI collections 
contain the same quantity of chocolate (8 oz.), the Italian BACI sells for $12.99 and the 
Venezuelan BACI costs $ 7.50. See id. at 163. The record also reflects that the Italian version of 
the Assortment collection (14.25 oz. for $26.99) weighs less and is more expensive than the 
Venezuelan version (15.6 oz. for $22.99). 
 
B. Applying the Standard. 
Applying the legal standard discussed in Part III, supra, to the record at bar, it is readily 
apparent that material differences exist between the Italian and Venezuelan PERUGINA. These 
differences -- which implicate quality, composition, packaging, and price -- if not overwhelming, 
are certainly relevant. We run the gamut. 
Differences in quality control methods, although not always obvious to the naked eye, are 
nonetheless important to the consumer. The precautions a company takes to preserve a food 
product's freshness are a prime example. Here, the parties' quality control procedures differ 
significantly. Even if Casa Helvetia's quality control measures are as effective as Nestle's - a 
dubious proposition on this record -- the fact that Nestle is unable to oversee the quality of the 
goods for the entire period until they reach the consumer is significant in ascertaining whether a 
Lanham Act violation exists. Regardless of the offending goods' actual quality, courts have issued 
Lanham Act injunctions solely because of the trademark owner's inability to control the quality of 
the goods bearing its name. Thus, the substantial variance in quality control here creates a 
presumption of customer confusion as a matter of law. 
The differences in presentation of the candies are also material. Although the district court 
dismissed the differences in packaging as "subtle," subtle differences are, as we have said, 
precisely the type that heighten the presumption of customer confusion. Consumers are more likely 
to be confused as to the origin of different goods bearing the same name when both goods are 
substantially identical in appearance. Furthermore, the differences in presentation and chocolate 
shape strike us as more than subtle. Glossy veneers, gold and silver wraps, and delicate sculpting 
add to the consumer's perception of quality. In the market for premium chocolates, often purchased 
as gifts, an elegant-looking package is an important consideration. The cosmetic differences 
between the Italian-made and the Venezuelan-made PERUGINA, therefore, might well perplex 
consumers and harm Nestle's goodwill. 
We are also hesitant to dismiss as trivial the differences in ingredients. While the district court 
may be correct in suggesting that "the ultimate consumer is [not] concerned about the country of 
origin of cocoa beans and hazelnuts," the measure of milk fat in the chocolates is potentially 
significant. Certainly, consumers care about the expected shelf life of food products. 
Price, without doubt, is also a variable with which purchasers are concerned. To the consumer 
(perhaps a gift buyer) who relishes a higher price for its connotation of quality and status, as well 
as to the chocolate aficionado who values his wallet more than his image, a difference of nearly 
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five and a half dollars (or, put another way, 73 percent) on a half-pound box of chocolate is a 
relevant datum. Furthermore, the fact that consumers  are willing to pay over five dollars more for 
the Italian-made chocolate than for its Venezuelan counterpart may suggest that consumers do care 
about the other differences between the two products. Afforded perfect information, consumers 
indifferent between the two would presumably not be willing to pay more for one than for the 
other. 
We need go no further. Given the low threshold of materiality that applies in gray goods cases, 
we find the above dissimilarities material in the aggregate. The use of the same PERUGINA label 
on chocolates manifesting such differences is presumptively likely to cause confusion. Casa 
Helvetia could, of course, have offered evidence to rebut this presumption -- but it has not done 
so. There is no proof that retailers explain to consumers the differences between the Italian and 
Venezuelan products. The record is likewise devoid of any evidence that consumers are indifferent 
about quality control procedures, packaging, ingredients, or price. Because the differences between 
the Italian and Venezuelan PERUGINA chocolates are material, the district court erred in denying 
plaintiffs' trademark infringement and unfair competition claims.  
 Reversed and remanded for the entry of appropriate injunctive relief and for further 
proceedings not inconsistent herewith.  
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
1. A Low Threshold.  As the court notes in Nestle, there is a low threshold of materiality that 
applies in gray goods cases.  Why is the threshold so low?  Is there any limiting principle that 
could be applied to the types of details that could constitute a material difference between imported 
and domestic products?  
2. Price?  One of the most surprising holdings of Nestle was that differences in price alone 
could support a finding that an imported product was materially different than a domestic product, 
even if the products were otherwise identical.  If this is the case, would the discount retailers of 
Thai-manufactured Nike athletic shoes discussed in the introduction to this Part be liable for 
trademark infringement?  Is this outcome consistent with the purpose of the trademark exhaustion 
doctrine? 
3. Consumer Preferences.  The court in Nestle observes that “The record is … devoid of any 
evidence that consumers are indifferent about quality control procedures, packaging, ingredients, 
or price.”  What if the defendant had conducted consumer taste tests and surveys demonstrating 
that most consumers could not tell the difference between the Italian and Venezuelan chocolates, 
and didn’t really care about the other factors?  Would the result have changed? 
4. An International Difference.  As shown in the Kirtsaeng and Impression Products cases, 
the tests for exhaustion of copyrighted and patented products does not change depending on 
whether the product originates domestically or abroad (those cases largely considering whether 
international exhaustion should exist at all).  In trademark cases, however, the tests for exhaustion 
are somewhat different for domestic and international products.  Consider that the Venezuelan 
Perugina chocolates found to be infringing in Nestle were unaltered when distributed in Puerto 
Rico. They were the exact products manufactured by Nestle’s authorized Venezuelan producer, 
Alimentos.  Unlike the refurbished surgical instrument in Surgi-Tech or the watches in Rolex, Casa 
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Helvetia made no changes at all to the candies produced and packaged by Alimentos. So why was 
Casa Helvetia liable for trademark infringement when reselling these authorized goods? 
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